

**Resolutions of the Conference  
of Contracting Governments  
to the International Convention for  
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974,  
adopted in December 2002**

**Conference resolution 2**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Adoption of the International Code for the  
Security of Ships and of Port Facilities**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

CONSIDERING that the new chapter XI-2 of the Convention makes a reference to an International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and requires ships, companies and port facilities to comply with the relevant requirements of part A of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as specified in part A of the ISPS Code,

BEING OF THE OPINION that the implementation by Contracting Governments of the said chapter will greatly contribute to the enhancement of maritime safety and security and safeguarding those on board and ashore,

HAVING CONSIDERED a draft of the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities prepared by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as the Organization), at its seventy-fifth and seventy-sixth sessions, for consideration and adoption by the Conference,

1. ADOPTS the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), the text of which is set out in the annex to the present resolution;

2. INVITES Contracting Governments to the Convention to note that the Code will take effect on 1 July 2004 upon entry into force of the new chapter XI-2 of the Convention;
3. REQUESTS the Maritime Safety Committee to keep the Code under review and amend it, as appropriate;
4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization to transmit certified copies of the present resolution and the text of the Code contained in the annex to all Contracting Governments to the Convention;
5. FURTHER REQUESTS the Secretary-General to transmit copies of this resolution and its annex to all Members of the Organization which are not Contracting Governments to the Convention.

## Annex International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities

### Preamble

**1** The Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security held in London in December 2002 adopted new provisions in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 and this Code\* to enhance maritime security. These new requirements form the international framework through which ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.

**2** Following the tragic events of 11th September 2001, the twenty-second session of the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization ("the Organization"), in November 2001, unanimously agreed to the development of new measures relating to the security of ships and of port facilities for adoption by a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (known as the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security) in December 2002. Preparation for the Diplomatic Conference was entrusted to the Organization's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) on the basis of submissions made by Member States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Organization.

**3** The MSC, at its first extraordinary session, held also in November 2001, in order to accelerate the development and the adoption of the appropriate security measures, established an MSC Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Security. The first meeting of the MSC Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Security was held in February 2002 and the outcome of its discussions was reported to, and considered by, the seventy-fifth session of the MSC in May 2002, when an *ad hoc* Working Group was established to further develop the proposals made. The seventy-fifth session of the MSC considered the report of that Working Group and recommended that work should be taken forward through a further MSC Intersessional Working Group, which was held in September 2002. The seventy-sixth session of the MSC considered the outcome of the September 2002 session of the MSC Intersessional Working Group and the further work undertaken by the MSC Working Group held in conjunction with

\* The complete name of the Code is the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities. The abbreviated name of this Code, as referred to in regulation XI-2/1 of SOLAS 74 as amended, is the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, or in short, the ISPS Code.

the Committee's seventy-sixth session in December 2002, immediately prior to the Diplomatic Conference, and agreed the final version of the proposed texts to be considered by the Diplomatic Conference.

**4** The Diplomatic Conference (9 to 13 December 2002) also adopted amendments to the existing provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) accelerating the implementation of the requirement to fit Automatic Identification Systems and adopted new regulations in chapter XI-1 of SOLAS 74 covering marking of the Ship Identification Number and the carriage of a Continuous Synopsis Record. The Diplomatic Conference also adopted a number of Conference resolutions, including those covering implementation and revision of this Code, technical co-operation, and co-operative work with the International Labour Organization and World Customs Organization. It was recognized that review and amendment of certain of the new provisions regarding maritime security may be required on completion of the work of these two Organizations.

**5** The provisions of chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 and this Code apply to ships and to port facilities. The extension of SOLAS 74 to cover port facilities was agreed on the basis that SOLAS 74 offered the speediest means of ensuring the necessary security measures entered into force and given effect quickly. However, it was further agreed that the provisions relating to port facilities should relate solely to the ship/port interface. The wider issue of the security of port areas will be the subject of further joint work between the International Maritime Organization and the International Labour Organization. It was also agreed that the provisions should not extend to the actual response to attacks or to any necessary clear-up activities after such an attack.

**6** In drafting the provision, care has been taken to ensure compatibility with the provisions of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended, the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and the harmonized system of survey and certification.

**7** The provisions represent a significant change in the approach of the international maritime industries to the issue of security in the maritime transport sector. It is recognized that they may place a significant additional burden on certain Contracting Governments. The importance of technical co-operation to assist Contracting Governments implement the provisions is fully recognized.

**8** Implementation of the provisions will require continuing effective co-operation and understanding between all those involved with, or using, ships and port facilities, including ship's personnel, port personnel, passengers, cargo interests, ship and port management and those in National and Local Authorities with security responsibilities. Existing practices and

procedures will have to be reviewed and changed if they do not provide an adequate level of security. In the interests of enhanced maritime security, additional responsibilities will have to be carried by the shipping and port industries and by National and Local Authorities.

9 The guidance given in part B of this Code should be taken into account when implementing the security provisions set out in chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 and in part A of this Code. However, it is recognized that the extent to which the guidance applies may vary depending on the nature of the port facility and of the ship, its trade and/or cargo.

10 Nothing in this Code shall be interpreted or applied in a manner inconsistent with the proper respect of fundamental rights and freedoms as set out in international instruments, particularly those relating to maritime workers and refugees, including the International Labour Organization Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as well as international standards concerning maritime and port workers.

11 Recognizing that the Convention on the Facilitation of Maritime Traffic, 1965, as amended, provides that foreign crew members shall be allowed ashore by the public authorities while the ship on which they arrive is in port, provided that the formalities on arrival of the ship have been fulfilled and the public authorities have no reason to refuse permission to come ashore for reasons of public health, public safety or public order, Contracting Governments, when approving ship and port facility security plans, should pay due cognisance to the fact that ship's personnel live and work on the vessel and need shore leave and access to shore-based seafarer welfare facilities, including medical care.

**Part A**  
**Mandatory requirements regarding the**  
**provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Annex to the**  
**International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea, 1974,**  
**as amended**

**1 General**

**1.1 Introduction**

This part of the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities contains mandatory provisions to which reference is made in chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended.

**1.2 Objectives**

The objectives of this Code are:

- .1** to establish an international framework involving co-operation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade;
- .2** to establish the respective roles and responsibilities of the Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries, at the national and international level, for ensuring maritime security;
- .3** to ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security-related information;
- .4** to provide a methodology for security assessments so as to have in place plans and procedures to react to changing security levels; and
- .5** to ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security measures are in place.

**1.3 Functional requirements**

In order to achieve its objectives, this Code embodies a number of functional requirements. These include, but are not limited to:

- .1** gathering and assessing information with respect to security threats and exchanging such information with appropriate Contracting Governments;

- .2 requiring the maintenance of communication protocols for ships and port facilities;
- .3 preventing unauthorized access to ships, port facilities and their restricted areas;
- .4 preventing the introduction of unauthorized weapons, incendiary devices or explosives to ships or port facilities;
- .5 providing means for raising the alarm in reaction to security threats or security incidents;
- .6 requiring ship and port facility security plans based upon security assessments; and
- .7 requiring training, drills and exercises to ensure familiarity with security plans and procedures.

## 2 Definitions

2.1 For the purpose of this part, unless expressly provided otherwise:

- .1 *Convention* means the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended.
- .2 *Regulation* means a regulation of the Convention.
- .3 *Chapter* means a chapter of the Convention.
- .4 *Ship security plan* means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures on board the ship designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ship's stores or the ship from the risks of a security incident.
- .5 *Port facility security plan* means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures designed to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport units and ship's stores within the port facility from the risks of a security incident.
- .6 *Ship security officer* means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master, designated by the Company as responsible for the security of the ship, including implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan, and for liaison with the company security officer and port facility security officers.
- .7 *Company security officer* means the person designated by the Company for ensuring that a ship security assessment is carried out; that a ship security plan is developed, submitted for approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained, and for liaison with port facility security officers and the ship security officer.

- .8** *Port facility security officer* means the person designated as responsible for the development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for liaison with the ship security officers and company security officers.
  - .9** *Security level 1* means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all times.
  - .10** *Security level 2* means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident.
  - .11** *Security level 3* means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.
- 2.2** The term “ship”, when used in this Code, includes mobile offshore drilling units and high-speed craft as defined in regulation XI-2/1.
- 2.3** The term “Contracting Government” in connection with any reference to a port facility, when used in sections 14 to 18, includes a reference to the Designated Authority.
- 2.4** Terms not otherwise defined in this part shall have the same meaning as the meaning attributed to them in chapters I and XI-2.

### **3 Application**

#### **3.1** This Code applies to:

- .1** the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:
  - .1** passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;
  - .2** cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards; and
  - .3** mobile offshore drilling units; and
- .2** port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.

**3.2** Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3.1.2, Contracting Governments shall decide the extent of application of this Part of the Code to those port facilities within their territory which, although used primarily by ships not engaged on international voyages, are required, occasionally, to serve ships arriving or departing on an international voyage.

**3.2.1** Contracting Governments shall base their decisions, under section 3.2, on a port facility security assessment carried out in accordance with this Part of the Code.



**3.2.2** Any decision which a Contracting Government makes, under section 3.2, shall not compromise the level of security intended to be achieved by chapter XI-2 or by this Part of the Code.

**3.3** This Code does not apply to warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships owned or operated by a Contracting Government and used only on Government non-commercial service.

**3.4** Sections 5 to 13 and 19 of this part apply to Companies and ships as specified in regulation XI-2/4.

**3.5** Sections 5 and 14 to 18 of this part apply to port facilities as specified in regulation XI-2/10.

**3.6** Nothing in this Code shall prejudice the rights or obligations of States under international law.

#### **4 Responsibilities of Contracting Governments**

**4.1** Subject to the provisions of regulation XI-2/3 and XI-2/7, Contracting Governments shall set security levels and provide guidance for protection from security incidents. Higher security levels indicate greater likelihood of occurrence of a security incident. Factors to be considered in setting the appropriate security level include:

- .1 the degree that the threat information is credible;
- .2 the degree that the threat information is corroborated;
- .3 the degree that the threat information is specific or imminent; and
- .4 the potential consequences of such a security incident.

**4.2** Contracting Governments, when they set security level 3, shall issue, as necessary, appropriate instructions and shall provide security-related information to the ships and port facilities that may be affected.

**4.3** Contracting Governments may delegate to a recognized security organization certain of their security-related duties under chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code with the exception of:

- .1 setting of the applicable security level;
- .2 approving a port facility security assessment and subsequent amendments to an approved assessment;
- .3 determining the port facilities which will be required to designate a port facility security officer;
- .4 approving a port facility security plan and subsequent amendments to an approved plan;
- .5 exercising control and compliance measures pursuant to regulation XI-2/9; and
- .6 establishing the requirements for a Declaration of Security.

**4.4** Contracting Governments shall, to the extent they consider appropriate, test the effectiveness of the ship security plans or the port facility security plans, or of amendments to such plans, they have approved, or, in the case of ships, of plans which have been approved on their behalf.

## **5 Declaration of Security**

**5.1** Contracting Governments shall determine when a Declaration of Security is required by assessing the risk the ship/port interface or ship-to-ship activity poses to persons, property or the environment.

**5.2** A ship can request completion of a Declaration of Security when:

- .1** the ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility or another ship it is interfacing with;
- .2** there is an agreement on a Declaration of Security between Contracting Governments covering certain international voyages or specific ships on those voyages;
- .3** there has been a security threat or a security incident involving the ship or involving the port facility, as applicable;
- .4** the ship is at a port which is not required to have and implement an approved port facility security plan; or
- .5** the ship is conducting ship-to-ship activities with another ship not required to have and implement an approved ship security plan.

**5.3** Requests for the completion of a Declaration of Security, under this section, shall be acknowledged by the applicable port facility or ship.

**5.4** The Declaration of Security shall be completed by:

- .1** the master or the ship security officer on behalf of the ship(s); and, if appropriate,
- .2** the port facility security officer or, if the Contracting Government determines otherwise, by any other body responsible for shore-side security, on behalf of the port facility.

**5.5** The Declaration of Security shall address the security requirements that could be shared between a port facility and a ship (or between ships) and shall state the responsibility for each.

**5.6** Contracting Governments shall specify, bearing in mind the provisions of regulation XI-2/9.2.3, the minimum period for which Declarations of Security shall be kept by the port facilities located within their territory.

**5.7** Administrations shall specify, bearing in mind the provisions of regulation XI-2/9.2.3, the minimum period for which Declarations of Security shall be kept by ships entitled to fly their flag.

## **6 Obligations of the Company**

**6.1** The Company shall ensure that the ship security plan contains a clear statement emphasizing the master's authority. The Company shall establish in the ship security plan that the master has the overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions with respect to the safety and security of the ship and to request the assistance of the Company or of any Contracting Government as may be necessary.

**6.2** The Company shall ensure that the company security officer, the master and the ship security officer are given the necessary support to fulfil their duties and responsibilities in accordance with chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code.

## **7 Ship security**

**7.1** A ship is required to act upon the security levels set by Contracting Governments as set out below.

**7.2** At security level 1, the following activities shall be carried out, through appropriate measures, on all ships, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code, in order to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents:

- .1** ensuring the performance of all ship security duties;
- .2** controlling access to the ship;
- .3** controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects;
- .4** monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
- .5** monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship;
- .6** supervising the handling of cargo and ship's stores; and
- .7** ensuring that security communication is readily available.

**7.3** At security level 2, additional protective measures, specified in the ship security plan, shall be implemented for each activity detailed in section 7.2, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**7.4** At security level 3, further specific protective measures, specified in the ship security plan, shall be implemented for each activity detailed in section 7.2, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**7.5** Whenever security level 2 or 3 is set by the Administration, the ship shall acknowledge receipt of the instructions on change of the security level.

**7.6** Prior to entering a port or whilst in a port within the territory of a Contracting Government that has set security level 2 or 3, the ship shall acknowledge receipt of this instruction and shall confirm to the port facility security officer the initiation of the implementation of the appropriate

measures and procedures as detailed in the ship security plan, and in the case of security level 3, in instructions issued by the Contracting Government which has set security level 3. The ship shall report any difficulties in implementation. In such cases, the port facility security officer and ship security officer shall liaise and co-ordinate the appropriate actions.

**7.7** If a ship is required by the Administration to set, or is already at, a higher security level than that set for the port it intends to enter or in which it is already located, then the ship shall advise, without delay, the competent authority of the Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located and the port facility security officer of the situation.

**7.7.1** In such cases, the ship security officer shall liaise with the port facility security officer and co-ordinate appropriate actions, if necessary.

**7.8** An Administration requiring ships entitled to fly its flag to set security level 2 or 3 in a port of another Contracting Government shall inform that Contracting Government without delay.

**7.9** When Contracting Governments set security levels and ensure the provision of security-level information to ships operating in their territorial sea, or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, such ships shall be advised to maintain vigilance and report immediately to their Administration and any nearby coastal States any information that comes to their attention that might affect maritime security in the area.

**7.9.1** When advising such ships of the applicable security level, a Contracting Government shall, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code, also advise those ships of any security measure that they should take and, if appropriate, of measures that have been taken by the Contracting Government to provide protection against the threat.

## **8 Ship security assessment**

**8.1** The ship security assessment is an essential and integral part of the process of developing and updating the ship security plan.

**8.2** The company security officer shall ensure that the ship security assessment is carried out by persons with appropriate skills to evaluate the security of a ship, in accordance with this section, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**8.3** Subject to the provisions of section 9.2.1, a recognized security organization may carry out the ship security assessment of a specific ship.

**8.4** The ship security assessment shall include an on-scene security survey and, at least, the following elements:

- .1** identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations;

- 2 identification and evaluation of key shipboard operations that it is important to protect;
  - 3 identification of possible threats to the key shipboard operations and the likelihood of their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures; and
  - 4 identification of weaknesses, including human factors, in the infrastructure, policies and procedures.
- 8.5** The ship security assessment shall be documented, reviewed, accepted and retained by the Company.

## **9 Ship security plan**

**9.1** Each ship shall carry on board a ship security plan approved by the Administration. The plan shall make provisions for the three security levels as defined in this Part of the Code.

**9.1.1** Subject to the provisions of section 9.2.1, a recognized security organization may prepare the ship security plan for a specific ship.

**9.2** The Administration may entrust the review and approval of ship security plans, or of amendments to a previously approved plan, to recognized security organizations.

**9.2.1** In such cases, the recognized security organization undertaking the review and approval of a ship security plan, or its amendments, for a specific ship shall not have been involved in either the preparation of the ship security assessment or of the ship security plan, or of the amendments, under review.

**9.3** The submission of a ship security plan, or of amendments to a previously approved plan, for approval shall be accompanied by the security assessment on the basis of which the plan, or the amendments, has been developed.

**9.4** Such a plan shall be developed, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code, and shall be written in the working language or languages of the ship. If the language or languages used is not English, French or Spanish, a translation into one of these languages shall be included. The plan shall address, at least, the following:

- .1 measures designed to prevent weapons, dangerous substances and devices intended for use against persons, ships or ports and the carriage of which is not authorized from being taken on board the ship;
- .2 identification of the restricted areas and measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to them;
- .3 measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to the ship;

- .4 procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security, including provisions for maintaining critical operations of the ship or ship/port interface;
- .5 procedures for responding to any security instructions Contracting Governments may give at security level 3;
- .6 procedures for evacuation in case of security threats or breaches of security;
- .7 duties of shipboard personnel assigned security responsibilities and of other shipboard personnel on security aspects;
- .8 procedures for auditing the security activities;
- .9 procedures for training, drills and exercises associated with the plan;
- .10 procedures for interfacing with port facility security activities;
- .11 procedures for the periodic review of the plan and for updating;
- .12 procedures for reporting security incidents;
- .13 identification of the ship security officer;
- .14 identification of the company security officer, including 24-hour contact details;
- .15 procedures to ensure the inspection, testing, calibration, and maintenance of any security equipment provided on board;
- .16 frequency for testing or calibration of any security equipment provided on board;
- .17 identification of the locations where the ship security alert system activation points are provided;\* and
- .18 procedures, instructions and guidance on the use of the ship security alert system, including the testing, activation, deactivation and resetting and to limit false alerts.\*

**9.4.1** Personnel conducting internal audits of the security activities specified in the plan or evaluating its implementation shall be independent of the activities being audited unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the Company or of the ship.

**9.5** The Administration shall determine which changes to an approved ship security plan or to any security equipment specified in an approved plan shall not be implemented unless the relevant amendments to the plan are approved by the Administration. Any such changes shall be at least as

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\* Administrations may allow, in order to avoid compromising in any way the objective of providing on board the ship security alert system, this information to be kept elsewhere on board in a document known to the master, the ship security officer and other senior shipboard personnel as may be decided by the Company.

effective as those measures prescribed in chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code.

**9.5.1** The nature of the changes to the ship security plan or the security equipment that have been specifically approved by the Administration, pursuant to section 9.5, shall be documented in a manner that clearly indicates such approval. This approval shall be available on board and shall be presented together with the International Ship Security Certificate (or the Interim International Ship Security Certificate). If these changes are temporary, once the original approved measures or equipment are reinstated, this documentation no longer needs to be retained by the ship.

**9.6** The plan may be kept in an electronic format. In such a case, it shall be protected by procedures aimed at preventing its unauthorized deletion, destruction or amendment.

**9.7** The plan shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

**9.8** Ship security plans are not subject to inspection by officers duly authorized by a Contracting Government to carry out control and compliance measures in accordance with regulation XI-2/9, save in circumstances specified in section 9.8.1.

**9.8.1** If the officers duly authorized by a Contracting Government have clear grounds to believe that the ship is not in compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the only means to verify or rectify the non-compliance is to review the relevant requirements of the ship security plan, limited access to the specific sections of the plan relating to the non-compliance is exceptionally allowed, but only with the consent of the Contracting Government of, or the master of, the ship concerned. Nevertheless, the provisions in the plan relating to section 9.4 subsections .2, .4, .5, .7, .15, .17 and .18 of this Part of the Code are considered as confidential information, and cannot be subject to inspection unless otherwise agreed by the Contracting Governments concerned.

## **10 Records**

**10.1** Records of the following activities addressed in the ship security plan shall be kept on board for at least the minimum period specified by the Administration, bearing in mind the provisions of regulation XI-2/9.2.3:

- .1** training, drills and exercises;
- .2** security threats and security incidents;
- .3** breaches of security;
- .4** changes in security level;
- .5** communications relating to the direct security of the ship such as specific threats to the ship or to port facilities the ship is, or has been, in;

- .6** internal audits and reviews of security activities;
  - .7** periodic review of the ship security assessment;
  - .8** periodic review of the ship security plan;
  - .9** implementation of any amendments to the plan; and
  - .10** maintenance, calibration and testing of any security equipment provided on board, including testing of the ship security alert system.
- 10.2** The records shall be kept in the working language or languages of the ship. If the language or languages used are not English, French or Spanish, a translation into one of these languages shall be included.
- 10.3** The records may be kept in an electronic format. In such a case, they shall be protected by procedures aimed at preventing their unauthorized deletion, destruction or amendment.
- 10.4** The records shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

## **11 Company security officer**

**11.1** The Company shall designate a company security officer. A person designated as the company security officer may act as the company security officer for one or more ships, depending on the number or types of ships the Company operates, provided it is clearly identified for which ships this person is responsible. A Company may, depending on the number or types of ships they operate, designate several persons as company security officers provided it is clearly identified for which ships each person is responsible.

**11.2** In addition to those specified elsewhere in this Part of the Code, the duties and responsibilities of the company security officer shall include, but are not limited to:

- .1** advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the ship, using appropriate security assessments and other relevant information;
- .2** ensuring that ship security assessments are carried out;
- .3** ensuring the development, the submission for approval, and thereafter the implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan;
- .4** ensuring that the ship security plan is modified, as appropriate, to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship;
- .5** arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities;
- .6** arranging for the initial and subsequent verifications of the ship by the Administration or the recognized security organization;



- .7 ensuring that deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance are promptly addressed and dealt with;
- .8 enhancing security awareness and vigilance;
- .9 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship;
- .10 ensuring effective communication and co-operation between the ship security officer and the relevant port facility security officers;
- .11 ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;
- .12 ensuring that, if sister-ship or fleet security plans are used, the plan for each ship reflects the ship-specific information accurately; and
- .13 ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a particular ship or group of ships are implemented and maintained.

## **12 Ship security officer**

**12.1** A ship security officer shall be designated on each ship.

**12.2** In addition to those specified elsewhere in this Part of the Code, the duties and responsibilities of the ship security officer shall include, but are not limited to:

- .1 undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate security measures are maintained;
- .2 maintaining and supervising the implementation of the ship security plan, including any amendments to the plan;
- .3 co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship's stores with other shipboard personnel and with the relevant port facility security officers;
- .4 proposing modifications to the ship security plan;
- .5 reporting to the company security officer any deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;
- .6 enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;
- .7 ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as appropriate;
- .8 reporting all security incidents;

- .9 co-ordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the company security officer and the relevant port facility security officer; and
- .10 ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and maintained, if any.

### **13 Training, drills and exercises on ship security**

**13.1** The company security officer and appropriate shore-based personnel shall have knowledge and have received training, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**13.2** The ship security officer shall have knowledge and have received training, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**13.3** Shipboard personnel having specific security duties and responsibilities shall understand their responsibilities for ship security as described in the ship security plan and shall have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**13.4** To ensure the effective implementation of the ship security plan, drills shall be carried out at appropriate intervals taking into account the ship type, ship personnel changes, port facilities to be visited and other relevant circumstances, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**13.5** The company security officer shall ensure the effective co-ordination and implementation of ship security plans by participating in exercises at appropriate intervals, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

### **14 Port facility security**

**14.1** A port facility is required to act upon the security levels set by the Contracting Government within whose territory it is located. Security measures and procedures shall be applied at the port facility in such a manner as to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to, passengers, ship, ship's personnel and visitors, goods and services.

**14.2** At security level 1, the following activities shall be carried out through appropriate measures in all port facilities, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code, in order to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents:

- .1 ensuring the performance of all port facility security duties;
- .2 controlling access to the port facility;

- 3** monitoring of the port facility, including anchoring and berthing area(s);
- 4** monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
- 5** supervising the handling of cargo;
- 6** supervising the handling of ship's stores; and
- 7** ensuring that security communication is readily available.

**14.3** At security level 2, additional protective measures, specified in the port facility security plan, shall be implemented for each activity detailed in section 14.2, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**14.4** At security level 3, further specific protective measures, specified in the port facility security plan, shall be implemented for each activity detailed in section 14.2, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**14.4.1** In addition, at security level 3, port facilities are required to respond to and implement any security instructions given by the Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located.

**14.5** When a port facility security officer is advised that a ship encounters difficulties in complying with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or this part or in implementing the appropriate measures and procedures as detailed in the ship security plan, and in the case of security level 3 following any security instructions given by the Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located, the port facility security officer and the ship security officer shall liaise and co-ordinate appropriate actions.

**14.6** When a port facility security officer is advised that a ship is at a security level which is higher than that of the port facility, the port facility security officer shall report the matter to the competent authority and shall liaise with the ship security officer and co-ordinate appropriate actions, if necessary.

## **15 Port facility security assessment**

**15.1** The port facility security assessment is an essential and integral part of the process of developing and updating the port facility security plan.

**15.2** The port facility security assessment shall be carried out by the Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located. A Contracting Government may authorize a recognized security organization to carry out the port facility security assessment of a specific port facility located within its territory.

**15.2.1** When the port facility security assessment has been carried out by a recognized security organization, the security assessment shall be reviewed

and approved for compliance with this section by the Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located.

**15.3** The persons carrying out the assessment shall have appropriate skills to evaluate the security of the port facility in accordance with this section, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**15.4** The port facility security assessments shall periodically be reviewed and updated, taking account of changing threats and/or minor changes in the port facility, and shall always be reviewed and updated when major changes to the port facility take place.

**15.5** The port facility security assessment shall include, at least, the following elements:

- .1** identification and evaluation of important assets and infrastructure it is important to protect;
- .2** identification of possible threats to the assets and infrastructure and the likelihood of their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures;
- .3** identification, selection and prioritization of countermeasures and procedural changes and their level of effectiveness in reducing vulnerability; and
- .4** identification of weaknesses, including human factors, in the infrastructure, policies and procedures.

**15.6** The Contracting Government may allow a port facility security assessment to cover more than one port facility if the operator, location, operation, equipment, and design of these port facilities are similar. Any Contracting Government which allows such an arrangement shall communicate to the Organization particulars thereof.

**15.7** Upon completion of the port facility security assessment, a report shall be prepared, consisting of a summary of how the assessment was conducted, a description of each vulnerability found during the assessment and a description of countermeasures that could be used to address each vulnerability. The report shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

## **16 Port facility security plan**

**16.1** A port facility security plan shall be developed and maintained, on the basis of a port facility security assessment for each port facility, adequate for the ship/port interface. The plan shall make provisions for the three security levels, as defined in this Part of the Code.

**16.1.1** Subject to the provisions of section 16.2, a recognized security organization may prepare the port facility security plan of a specific port facility.

**16.2** The port facility security plan shall be approved by the Contracting Government in whose territory the port facility is located.

**16.3** Such a plan shall be developed taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code and shall be in the working language of the port facility. The plan shall address, at least, the following:

- .1 measures designed to prevent weapons or any other dangerous substances and devices intended for use against persons, ships or ports, and the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced into the port facility or on board a ship;
- .2 measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to the port facility, to ships moored at the facility, and to restricted areas of the facility;
- .3 procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security, including provisions for maintaining critical operations of the port facility or ship/port interface;
- .4 procedures for responding to any security instructions the Contracting Government in whose territory the port facility is located may give at security level 3;
- .5 procedures for evacuation in case of security threats or breaches of security;
- .6 duties of port facility personnel assigned security responsibilities and of other facility personnel on security aspects;
- .7 procedures for interfacing with ship security activities;
- .8 procedures for the periodic review of the plan and updating;
- .9 procedures for reporting security incidents;
- .10 identification of the port facility security officer, including 24-hour contact details;
- .11 measures to ensure the security of the information contained in the plan;
- .12 measures designed to ensure effective security of cargo and the cargo handling equipment at the port facility;
- .13 procedures for auditing the port facility security plan;
- .14 procedures for responding in case the ship security alert system of a ship at the port facility has been activated; and
- .15 procedures for facilitating shore leave for ship's personnel or personnel changes, as well as access of visitors to the ship, including representatives of seafarers' welfare and labour organizations.

**16.4** Personnel conducting internal audits of the security activities specified in the plan or evaluating its implementation shall be independent

of the activities being audited unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the port facility.

**16.5** The port facility security plan may be combined with, or be part of, the port security plan or any other port emergency plan or plans.

**16.6** The Contracting Government in whose territory the port facility is located shall determine which changes to the port facility security plan shall not be implemented unless the relevant amendments to the plan are approved by them.

**16.7** The plan may be kept in an electronic format. In such a case, it shall be protected by procedures aimed at preventing its unauthorized deletion, destruction or amendment.

**16.8** The plan shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

**16.9** Contracting Governments may allow a port facility security plan to cover more than one port facility if the operator, location, operation, equipment, and design of these port facilities are similar. Any Contracting Government which allows such an alternative arrangement shall communicate to the Organization particulars thereof.

## **17 Port facility security officer**

**17.1** A port facility security officer shall be designated for each port facility. A person may be designated as the port facility security officer for one or more port facilities.

**17.2** In addition to those specified elsewhere in this Part of the Code, the duties and responsibilities of the port facility security officer shall include, but are not limited to:

- .1** conducting an initial comprehensive security survey of the port facility, taking into account the relevant port facility security assessment;
- .2** ensuring the development and maintenance of the port facility security plan;
- .3** implementing and exercising the port facility security plan;
- .4** undertaking regular security inspections of the port facility to ensure the continuation of appropriate security measures;
- .5** recommending and incorporating, as appropriate, modifications to the port facility security plan in order to correct deficiencies and to update the plan to take into account relevant changes to the port facility;
- .6** enhancing security awareness and vigilance of the port facility personnel;

- .7 ensuring adequate training has been provided to personnel responsible for the security of the port facility;
- .8 reporting to the relevant authorities and maintaining records of occurrences which threaten the security of the port facility;
- .9 co-ordinating implementation of the port facility security plan with the appropriate Company and ship security officer(s);
- .10 co-ordinating with security services, as appropriate;
- .11 ensuring that standards for personnel responsible for security of the port facility are met;
- .12 ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and maintained, if any; and
- .13 assisting ship security officers in confirming the identity of those seeking to board the ship when requested.

**17.3** The port facility security officer shall be given the necessary support to fulfil the duties and responsibilities imposed by chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code.

## **18 Training, drills and exercises on port facility security**

**18.1** The port facility security officer and appropriate port facility security personnel shall have knowledge and have received training, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**18.2** Port facility personnel having specific security duties shall understand their duties and responsibilities for port facility security, as described in the port facility security plan, and shall have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

**18.3** To ensure the effective implementation of the port facility security plan, drills shall be carried out at appropriate intervals, taking into account the types of operation of the port facility, port facility personnel changes, the type of ship the port facility is serving and other relevant circumstances, taking into account guidance given in part B of this Code.

**18.4** The port facility security officer shall ensure the effective co-ordination and implementation of the port facility security plan by participating in exercises at appropriate intervals, taking into account the guidance given in part B of this Code.

## 19 Verification and certification for ships

### 19.1 Verifications

**19.1.1** Each ship to which this Part of the Code applies shall be subject to the verifications specified below:

- .1** an initial verification before the ship is put in service or before the certificate required under section 19.2 is issued for the first time, which shall include a complete verification of its security system and any associated security equipment covered by the relevant provisions of chapter XI-2, of this Part of the Code and of the approved ship security plan. This verification shall ensure that the security system and any associated security equipment of the ship fully complies with the applicable requirements of chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code, is in satisfactory condition and fit for the service for which the ship is intended;
- .2** a renewal verification at intervals specified by the Administration, but not exceeding five years, except where section 19.3 is applicable. This verification shall ensure that the security system and any associated security equipment of the ship fully complies with the applicable requirements of chapter XI-2, this Part of the Code and the approved ship security plan, is in satisfactory condition and fit for the service for which the ship is intended;
- .3** at least one intermediate verification. If only one intermediate verification is carried out it shall take place between the second and third anniversary date of the certificate as defined in regulation I/2(n). The intermediate verification shall include inspection of the security system and any associated security equipment of the ship to ensure that it remains satisfactory for the service for which the ship is intended. Such intermediate verification shall be endorsed on the certificate;
- .4** any additional verifications as determined by the Administration.

**19.1.2** The verifications of ships shall be carried out by officers of the Administration. The Administration may, however, entrust the verifications to a recognized security organization referred to in regulation XI-2/1.

**19.1.3** In every case, the Administration concerned shall fully guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the verification and shall undertake to ensure the necessary arrangements to satisfy this obligation.

**19.1.4** The security system and any associated security equipment of the ship after verification shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of regulations XI-2/4.2 and XI-2/6, of this Part of the Code and of the approved ship security plan. After any verification under section 19.1.1 has been completed, no changes shall be made in the security system and in any



associated security equipment or the approved ship security plan without the sanction of the Administration.

## **19.2 Issue or endorsement of Certificate**

**19.2.1** An International Ship Security Certificate shall be issued after the initial or renewal verification in accordance with the provisions of section 19.1.

**19.2.2** Such Certificate shall be issued or endorsed either by the Administration or by a recognized security organization acting on behalf of the Administration.

**19.2.3** Another Contracting Government may, at the request of the Administration, cause the ship to be verified and, if satisfied that the provisions of section 19.1.1 are complied with, shall issue or authorize the issue of an International Ship Security Certificate to the ship and, where appropriate, endorse or authorize the endorsement of that Certificate on the ship, in accordance with this Code.

**19.2.3.1** A copy of the Certificate and a copy of the verification report shall be transmitted as soon as possible to the requesting Administration.

**19.2.3.2** A Certificate so issued shall contain a statement to the effect that it has been issued at the request of the Administration and it shall have the same force and receive the same recognition as the Certificate issued under section 19.2.2.

**19.2.4** The International Ship Security Certificate shall be drawn up in a form corresponding to the model given in the appendix to this Code. If the language used is not English, French or Spanish, the text shall include a translation into one of these languages.

## **19.3 Duration and validity of Certificate**

**19.3.1** An International Ship Security Certificate shall be issued for a period specified by the Administration, which shall not exceed five years.

**19.3.2** When the renewal verification is completed within three months before the expiry date of the existing Certificate, the new Certificate shall be valid from the date of completion of the renewal verification to a date not exceeding five years from the date of expiry of the existing Certificate.

**19.3.2.1** When the renewal verification is completed after the expiry date of the existing Certificate, the new Certificate shall be valid from the date of completion of the renewal verification to a date not exceeding five years from the date of expiry of the existing Certificate.

**19.3.2.2** When the renewal verification is completed more than three months before the expiry date of the existing Certificate, the new Certificate shall be valid from the date of completion of the renewal

verification to a date not exceeding five years from the date of completion of the renewal verification.

**19.3.3** If a Certificate is issued for a period of less than five years, the Administration may extend the validity of the Certificate beyond the expiry date to the maximum period specified in section 19.3.1, provided that the verifications referred to in section 19.1.1 applicable when a Certificate is issued for a period of five years are carried out as appropriate.

**19.3.4** If a renewal verification has been completed and a new Certificate cannot be issued or placed on board the ship before the expiry date of the existing Certificate, the Administration or recognized security organization acting on behalf of the Administration may endorse the existing Certificate and such a Certificate shall be accepted as valid for a further period which shall not exceed five months from the expiry date.

**19.3.5** If a ship, at the time when a Certificate expires, is not in a port in which it is to be verified, the Administration may extend the period of validity of the Certificate but this extension shall be granted only for the purpose of allowing the ship to complete its voyage to the port in which it is to be verified, and then only in cases where it appears proper and reasonable to do so. No Certificate shall be extended for a period longer than three months, and the ship to which an extension is granted shall not, on its arrival in the port in which it is to be verified, be entitled by virtue of such extension to leave that port without having a new Certificate. When the renewal verification is completed, the new Certificate shall be valid to a date not exceeding five years from the expiry date of the existing Certificate before the extension was granted.

**19.3.6** A Certificate issued to a ship engaged on short voyages which has not been extended under the foregoing provisions of this section may be extended by the Administration for a period of grace of up to one month from the date of expiry stated on it. When the renewal verification is completed, the new Certificate shall be valid to a date not exceeding five years from the date of expiry of the existing Certificate before the extension was granted.

**19.3.7** If an intermediate verification is completed before the period specified in section 19.1.1, then:

- .1 the expiry date shown on the Certificate shall be amended by endorsement to a date which shall not be more than three years later than the date on which the intermediate verification was completed;
- .2 the expiry date may remain unchanged provided one or more additional verifications are carried out so that the maximum intervals between the verifications prescribed by section 19.1.1 are not exceeded.

**19.3.8** A Certificate issued under section 19.2 shall cease to be valid in any of the following cases:

- .1 if the relevant verifications are not completed within the periods specified under section 19.1.1;
- .2 if the Certificate is not endorsed in accordance with section 19.1.1.3 and 19.3.7.1, if applicable;
- .3 when a Company assumes the responsibility for the operation of a ship not previously operated by that Company; and
- .4 upon transfer of the ship to the flag of another State.

**19.3.9** In the case of:

- .1 a transfer of a ship to the flag of another Contracting Government, the Contracting Government whose flag the ship was formerly entitled to fly shall, as soon as possible, transmit to the receiving Administration copies of, or all information relating to, the International Ship Security Certificate carried by the ship before the transfer and copies of available verification reports, or
- .2 a Company that assumes responsibility for the operation of a ship not previously operated by that Company, the previous Company shall, as soon as possible, transmit to the receiving Company copies of any information related to the International Ship Security Certificate or to facilitate the verifications described in section 19.4.2.

#### **19.4** *Interim certification*

**19.4.1** The Certificates specified in section 19.2 shall be issued only when the Administration issuing the Certificate is fully satisfied that the ship complies with the requirements of section 19.1. However, after 1 July 2004, for the purposes of:

- .1 a ship without a Certificate, on delivery or prior to its entry or re-entry into service;
- .2 transfer of a ship from the flag of a Contracting Government to the flag of another Contracting Government;
- .3 transfer of a ship to the flag of a Contracting Government from a State which is not a Contracting Government; or
- .4 a Company assuming the responsibility for the operation of a ship not previously operated by that Company

until the Certificate referred to in section 19.2 is issued, the Administration may cause an Interim International Ship Security Certificate to be issued, in a form corresponding to the model given in the appendix to this Part of the Code.

**19.4.2** An Interim International Ship Security Certificate shall only be issued when the Administration or recognized security organization, on behalf of the Administration, has verified that:

- .1 the ship security assessment required by this Part of the Code has been completed;
- .2 a copy of the ship security plan meeting the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code is provided on board, has been submitted for review and approval, and is being implemented on the ship;
- .3 the ship is provided with a ship security alert system meeting the requirements of regulation XI-2/6, if required;
- .4 the company security officer:
  - .1 has ensured:
    - .1 the review of the ship security plan for compliance with this Part of the Code;
    - .2 that the plan has been submitted for approval; and
    - .3 that the plan is being implemented on the ship; and
  - .2 has established the necessary arrangements, including arrangements for drills, exercises and internal audits, through which the company security officer is satisfied that the ship will successfully complete the required verification in accordance with section 19.1.1.1, within 6 months;
- .5 arrangements have been made for carrying out the required verifications under section 19.1.1.1;
- .6 the master, the ship security officer and other ship's personnel with specific security duties are familiar with their duties and responsibilities as specified in this Part of the Code; and with the relevant provisions of the ship security plan placed on board; and have been provided such information in the working language of the ship's personnel or languages understood by them; and
- .7 the ship security officer meets the requirements of this Part of the Code.

**19.4.3** An Interim International Ship Security Certificate may be issued by the Administration or by a recognized security organization authorized to act on its behalf.

**19.4.4** An Interim International Ship Security Certificate shall be valid for 6 months, or until the Certificate required by section 19.2 is issued, whichever comes first, and may not be extended.

**19.4.5** No Contracting Government shall cause a subsequent, consecutive Interim International Ship Security Certificate to be issued to a ship if, in

the judgement of the Administration or the recognized security organization, one of the purposes of the ship or a Company in requesting such Certificate is to avoid full compliance with chapter XI-2 and this Part of the Code beyond the period of the initial Interim Certificate as specified in section 19.4.4.

**19.4.6** For the purposes of regulation XI-2/9, Contracting Governments may, prior to accepting an Interim International Ship Security Certificate as a valid Certificate, ensure that the requirements of sections 19.4.2.4 to 19.4.2.6 have been met.

## Appendix to part A

### Appendix 1

# Form of the International Ship Security Certificate

## INTERNATIONAL SHIP SECURITY CERTIFICATE

*(Official seal)*

*(State)*

Certificate Number .....

Issued under the provisions of the  
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE SECURITY OF SHIPS AND OF PORT FACILITIES  
(ISPS CODE)

under the authority of the Government of

\_\_\_\_\_  
*(name of State)*

by

\_\_\_\_\_  
*(person(s) or organization authorized)*

Name of ship .....

Distinctive number or letters .....

Port of registry .....

Type of ship .....

Gross tonnage .....

IMO Number .....

Name and address of the Company .....

THIS IS TO CERTIFY:

- 1 that the security system and any associated security equipment of the ship has been verified in accordance with section 19.1 of part A of the ISPS Code;
- 2 that the verification showed that the security system and any associated security equipment of the ship is in all respects satisfactory and that the ship complies with the applicable requirements of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the ISPS Code;
- 3 that the ship is provided with an approved ship security plan.

Date of initial/renewal verification on which this Certificate is based .....

This Certificate is valid until ..... subject to verifications in accordance with section 19.1.1 of part A of the ISPS Code.

Issued at .....  
*(Place of issue of certificate)*

Date of issue .....  
*(Signature of the duly authorized official  
issuing the Certificate)*

*(Seal or stamp of issuing authority, as appropriate)*





**Additional verification in accordance with section A/19.3.7.2 of the ISPS Code**

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that at an additional verification required by section 19.3.7.2 of part A of the ISPS Code the ship was found to comply with the relevant provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the ISPS Code.

Signed: .....  
(Signature of authorized official)

Place: .....

Date: .....

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

**Endorsement to extend the certificate if valid for less than 5 years where section A/19.3.3 of the ISPS Code applies**

The ship complies with the relevant provisions of part A of the ISPS Code, and the Certificate shall, in accordance with section 19.3.3 of part A of the ISPS Code, be accepted as valid until .....

Signed: .....  
(Signature of authorized official)

Place: .....

Date: .....

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

**Endorsement where the renewal verification has been completed and section A/19.3.4 of the ISPS Code applies**

The ship complies with the relevant provisions of part A of the ISPS Code, and the Certificate shall, in accordance with section 19.3.4 of part A of the ISPS Code, be accepted as valid until .....

Signed: .....  
(Signature of authorized official)

Place: .....

Date: .....

(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)

***Endorsement to extend the validity of the certificate until reaching the port of verification where section A/19.3.5 of the ISPS Code applies or for a period of grace where section A/19.3.6 of the ISPS Code applies***

This Certificate shall, in accordance with section 19.3.5/19.3.6\* of part A of the ISPS Code, be accepted as valid until .....

Signed: .....  
*(Signature of authorized official)*

Place: .....

Date: .....

*(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)*

***Endorsement for advancement of expiry date where section A/19.3.7.1 of the ISPS Code applies***

In accordance with section 19.3.7.1 of part A of the ISPS Code, the new expiry date<sup>†</sup> is .....

Signed: .....  
*(Signature of authorized official)*

Place: .....

Date: .....

*(Seal or stamp of the authority, as appropriate)*

---

\* Delete as appropriate.

† In case of completion of this part of the Certificate, the expiry date shown on the front of the Certificate shall also be amended accordingly.

Appendix 2

**Form of the Interim International Ship  
Security Certificate**

**INTERIM INTERNATIONAL SHIP SECURITY CERTIFICATE**

*(Official seal)*

*(State)*

Certificate Number .....

Issued under the provisions of the  
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE SECURITY OF SHIPS AND OF PORT FACILITIES  
(ISPS CODE)

under the authority of the Government of

\_\_\_\_\_  
*(name of State)*

by

\_\_\_\_\_  
*(person(s) or organization authorized)*

Name of ship .....

Distinctive number or letters .....

Port of registry .....

Type of ship .....

Gross tonnage .....

IMO Number .....

Name and address of Company .....

Is this a subsequent, consecutive Interim Certificate? Yes/No\*

If Yes, date of issue of initial Interim Certificate .....

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT the requirements of section A/19.4.2 of the ISPS Code have been complied with.

This Certificate is issued pursuant to section A/19.4 of the ISPS Code.

This Certificate is valid until .....

Issued at.....  
*(Place of issue of the Certificate)*

(Date of issue) .....  
*(Signature of the duly authorized official  
issuing the Certificate)*

*(Seal or stamp of issuing authority, as appropriate)*

---

\* Delete as appropriate.

## Part B

### Guidance regarding the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended and part A of this Code

#### 1 Introduction

##### *General*

**1.1** The preamble of this Code indicates that chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code establish the new international framework of measures to enhance maritime security and through which ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.

**1.2** This introduction outlines, in a concise manner, the processes envisaged in establishing and implementing the measures and arrangements needed to achieve and maintain compliance with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and of part A of this Code and identifies the main elements on which guidance is offered. The guidance is provided in paragraphs 2 through to 19. It also sets down essential considerations which should be taken into account when considering the application of the guidance relating to ships and port facilities.

**1.3** If the reader's interest relates to ships alone, it is strongly recommended that this Part of the Code is still read as a whole, particularly the paragraphs relating to port facilities. The same applies to those whose primary interest is port facilities; they should also read the paragraphs relating to ships.

**1.4** The guidance provided in the following paragraphs relates primarily to protection of the ship when it is at a port facility. There could, however, be situations when a ship may pose a threat to the port facility, e.g. because, once within the port facility, it could be used as a base from which to launch an attack. When considering the appropriate security measures to respond to ship-based security threats, those completing the port facility security assessment or preparing the port facility security plan should consider making appropriate adaptations to the guidance offered in the following paragraphs.

**1.5** The reader is advised that nothing in this Part of the Code should be read or interpreted in conflict with any of the provisions of either chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code and that the aforesaid provisions always prevail and override any unintended inconsistency which may have been inadvertently expressed in this Part of the Code. The guidance provided in this Part of the Code should always be read, interpreted and applied in a

manner which is consistent with the aims, objectives and principles established in chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

### *Responsibilities of Contracting Governments*

**1.6** Contracting Governments have, under the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, various responsibilities, which, amongst others, include:

- setting the applicable security level;
- approving the ship security plan (SSP) and relevant amendments to a previously approved plan;
- verifying the compliance of ships with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code and issuing to ships the International Ship Security Certificate;
- determining which of the port facilities located within their territory are required to designate a port facility security officer (PFSO) who will be responsible for the preparation of the port facility security plan;
- ensuring completion and approval of the port facility security assessment (PFSA) and of any subsequent amendments to a previously approved assessment;
- approving the port facility security plan (PFSP) and any subsequent amendments to a previously approved plan;
- exercising control and compliance measures;
- testing approved plans; and
- communicating information to the International Maritime Organization and to the shipping and port industries.

**1.7** Contracting Governments can designate, or establish, Designated Authorities within Government to undertake, with respect to port facilities, their security duties under chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code and allow recognized security organizations to carry out certain work with respect to port facilities, but the final decision on the acceptance and approval of this work should be given by the Contracting Government or the Designated Authority. Administrations may also delegate the undertaking of certain security duties, relating to ships, to recognized security organizations. The following duties or activities cannot be delegated to a recognized security organization:

- setting of the applicable security level;
- determining which of the port facilities located within the territory of a Contracting Government are required to designate a PFSO and to prepare a PFSP;

- approving a PFSA or any subsequent amendments to a previously approved assessment;
- approving a PFSP or any subsequent amendments to a previously approved plan;
- exercising control and compliance measures; and
- establishing the requirements for a Declaration of Security.

### *Setting the security level*

**1.8** The setting of the security level applying at any particular time is the responsibility of Contracting Governments and can apply to ships and port facilities. Part A of this Code defines three security levels for international use. These are:

- Security level 1, normal; the level at which ships and port facilities normally operate;
- Security level 2, heightened; the level applying for as long as there is a heightened risk of a security incident; and
- Security level 3, exceptional; the level applying for the period of time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident.

### *The Company and the ship*

**1.9** Any Company operating ships to which chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code apply has to designate a CSO for the Company and an SSO for each of its ships. The duties, responsibilities and training requirements of these officers and requirements for drills and exercises are defined in part A of this Code.

**1.10** The company security officer's responsibilities include, in brief amongst others, ensuring that a ship security assessment (SSA) is properly carried out, that an SSP is prepared and submitted for approval by, or on behalf of, the Administration and thereafter is placed on board each ship to which part A of this Code applies and in respect of which that person has been appointed as the CSO.

**1.11** The SSP should indicate the operational and physical security measures the ship itself should take to ensure it always operates at security level 1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensified, security measures the ship itself can take to move to and operate at security level 2 when instructed to do so. Furthermore, the plan should indicate the possible preparatory actions the ship could take to allow prompt response to the instructions that may be issued to the ship by those responding at security level 3 to a security incident or threat thereof.

**1.12** The ships to which the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code apply are required to have, and be operated in accordance with, an SSP approved by, or on behalf of, the Administration. The CSO and SSO should monitor the continuing relevance and effectiveness of the plan, including the undertaking of internal audits. Amendments to any of the elements of an approved plan, for which the Administration has determined that approval is required, have to be submitted for review and approval before their incorporation into the approved plan and their implementation by the ship.

**1.13** The ship has to carry an International Ship Security Certificate indicating that it complies with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code. Part A of this Code includes provisions relating to the verification and certification of the ship's compliance with the requirements on an initial, renewal and intermediate verification basis.

**1.14** When a ship is at a port or is proceeding to a port of a Contracting Government, the Contracting Government has the right, under the provisions of regulation XI-2/9, to exercise various control and compliance measures with respect to that ship. The ship is subject to port State control inspections but such inspections will not normally extend to examination of the SSP itself except in specific circumstances. The ship may also be subject to additional control measures if the Contracting Government exercising the control and compliance measures has reason to believe that the security of the ship has, or the port facilities it has served have, been compromised.

**1.15** The ship is also required to have on board information, to be made available to Contracting Governments upon request, indicating who is responsible for deciding the employment of the ship's personnel and for deciding various aspects relating to the employment of the ship.

### *The port facility*

**1.16** Each Contracting Government has to ensure completion of a PFSA for each of the port facilities, located within its territory, serving ships engaged on international voyages. The Contracting Government, a Designated Authority or a recognized security organization may carry out this assessment. The completed PFSA has to be approved by the Contracting Government or the Designated Authority concerned. This approval cannot be delegated. Port facility security assessments should be periodically reviewed.

**1.17** The PFSA is fundamentally a risk analysis of all aspects of a port facility's operation in order to determine which part(s) of it are more susceptible, and/or more likely, to be the subject of attack. Security risk is a function of the threat of an attack coupled with the vulnerability of the target and the consequences of an attack.



The assessment must include the following components:

- the determination of the perceived threat to port installations and infrastructure;
- identification of the potential vulnerabilities; and
- calculation of the consequences of incidents calculated.

On completion of the analysis, it will be possible to produce an overall assessment of the level of risk. The PFSA will help determine which port facilities are required to appoint a PFSO and prepare a PFSP.

**1.18** The port facilities which have to comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code are required to designate a PFSO. The duties, responsibilities and training requirements of these officers and requirements for drills and exercises are defined in part A of this Code.

**1.19** The PFSP should indicate the operational and physical security measures the port facility should take to ensure that it always operates at security level 1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensified, security measures the port facility can take to move to and operate at security level 2 when instructed to do so. Furthermore, the plan should indicate the possible preparatory actions the port facility could take to allow prompt response to the instructions that may be issued by those responding at security level 3 to a security incident or threat thereof.

**1.20** The port facilities which have to comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code are required to have, and operate in accordance with, a PFSP approved by the Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority concerned. The PFSO should implement its provisions and monitor the continuing effectiveness and relevance of the plan, including commissioning internal audits of the application of the plan. Amendments to any of the elements of an approved plan for which the Contracting Government or the Designated Authority concerned has determined that approval is required, have to be submitted for review and approval before their incorporation into the approved plan and their implementation at the port facility. The Contracting Government or the Designated Authority concerned may test the effectiveness of the plan. The PFSA covering the port facility or on which the development of the plan has been based should be regularly reviewed. All these activities may lead to amendment of the approved plan. Any amendments to specified elements of an approved plan will have to be submitted for approval by the Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority concerned.

**1.21** Ships using port facilities may be subject to the port State control inspections and additional control measures outlined in regulation XI-2/9. The relevant authorities may request the provision of information regarding the ship, its cargo, passengers and ship's personnel prior to the ship's entry into port. There may be circumstances in which entry into port could be denied.

### *Information and communication*

**1.22** Chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code require Contracting Governments to provide certain information to the International Maritime Organization and for information to be made available to allow effective communication between Contracting Governments and between company security officers/ship security officers and the port facility security officers.

## **2 Definitions**

**2.1** No guidance is provided with respect to the definitions set out in chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code.

**2.2** For the purpose of this Part of the Code:

- .1** *section* means a section of part A of the Code and is indicated as “section A/<followed by the number of the section>”;
- .2** *paragraph* means a paragraph of this Part of the Code and is indicated as “paragraph <followed by the number of the paragraph>”; and
- .3** *Contracting Government*, when used in paragraphs 14 to 18, means the Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located, and includes a reference to the Designated Authority.

## **3 Application**

### *General*

**3.1** The guidance given in this Part of the Code should be taken into account when implementing the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

**3.2** However, it should be recognized that the extent to which the guidance on ships applies will depend on the type of ship, its cargoes and/or passengers, its trading pattern and the characteristics of the port facilities visited by the ship.

**3.3** Similarly, in relation to the guidance on port facilities, the extent to which this guidance applies will depend on the port facilities, the types of ships using the port facility, the types of cargo and/or passengers and the trading patterns of visiting ships.

**3.4** The provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code are not intended to apply to port facilities designed and used primarily for military purposes.

## **4 Responsibilities of Contracting Governments**

### *Security of assessments and plans*

**4.1** Contracting Governments should ensure that appropriate measures are in place to avoid unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, security-sensitive material relating to ship security assessments, ship security plans, port facility security assessments and port facility security plans, and to individual assessments or plans.

### *Designated Authorities*

**4.2** Contracting Governments may identify a Designated Authority within Government to undertake their security duties relating to port facilities as set out in chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code.

### *Recognized security organizations*

**4.3** Contracting Governments may authorize a recognized security organization (RSO) to undertake certain security-related activities, including:

- .1** approval of ship security plans, or amendments thereto, on behalf of the Administration;
- .2** verification and certification of compliance of ships with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code on behalf of the Administration; and
- .3** conducting port facility security assessments required by the Contracting Government.

**4.4** An RSO may also advise or provide assistance to Companies or port facilities on security matters, including ship security assessments, ship security plans, port facility security assessments and port facility security plans. This can include completion of an SSA or SSP or PFSA or PFSP. If an RSO has done so in respect of an SSA or SSP, that RSO should not be authorized to approve that SSP.

**4.5** When authorizing an RSO, Contracting Governments should give consideration to the competency of such an organization. An RSO should be able to demonstrate:

- .1** expertise in relevant aspects of security;
- .2** appropriate knowledge of ship and port operations, including knowledge of ship design and construction if providing services in respect of ships and of port design and construction if providing services in respect of port facilities;
- .3** their capability to assess the likely security risks that could occur during ship and port facility operations, including the ship/port interface, and how to minimize such risks;

- 4** their ability to maintain and improve the expertise of their personnel;
- 5** their ability to monitor the continuing trustworthiness of their personnel;
- 6** their ability to maintain appropriate measures to avoid unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, security-sensitive material;
- 7** their knowledge of the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code and relevant national and international legislation and security requirements;
- 8** their knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- 9** their knowledge of recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- 10** their knowledge of recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
- 11** their knowledge of techniques used to circumvent security measures; and
- 12** their knowledge of security and surveillance equipment and systems and their operational limitations.

When delegating specific duties to an RSO, Contracting Governments, including Administrations, should ensure that the RSO has the competencies needed to undertake the task.

**4.6** A recognized organization, as referred to in regulation I/6 and fulfilling the requirements of regulation XI-1/1, may be appointed as an RSO provided it has the appropriate security-related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.

**4.7** A port or harbour authority or port facility operator may be appointed as an RSO provided it has the appropriate security-related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5.

### *Setting the security level*

**4.8** In setting the security level, Contracting Governments should take account of general and specific threat information. Contracting Governments should set the security level applying to ships or port facilities at one of three levels:

- Security level 1, normal; the level at which the ship or port facility normally operates;
- Security level 2, heightened; the level applying for as long as there is a heightened risk of a security incident; and

- Security level 3, exceptional; the level applying for the period of time when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security incident.

**4.9** Setting security level 3 should be an exceptional measure applying only when there is credible information that a security incident is probable or imminent. Security level 3 should only be set for the duration of the identified security threat or actual security incident. While the security levels may change from security level 1, through security level 2 to security level 3, it is also possible that the security levels will change directly from security level 1 to security level 3.

**4.10** At all times the master of a ship has the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of the ship. Even at security level 3 a master may seek clarification or amendment of instructions issued by those responding to a security incident, or threat thereof, if there are reasons to believe that compliance with any instruction may imperil the safety of the ship.

**4.11** The CSO or the SSO should liaise at the earliest opportunity with the PFSO of the port facility the ship is intended to visit to establish the security level applying for that ship at the port facility. Having established contact with a ship, the PFSO should advise the ship of any subsequent change in the port facility's security level and should provide the ship with any relevant security information.

**4.12** While there may be circumstances when an individual ship may be operating at a higher security level than the port facility it is visiting, there will be no circumstances when a ship can have a lower security level than the port facility it is visiting. If a ship has a higher security level than the port facility it intends to use, the CSO or SSO should advise the PFSO without delay. The PFSO should undertake an assessment of the particular situation in consultation with the CSO or SSO and agree on appropriate security measures with the ship, which may include completion and signing of a Declaration of Security.

**4.13** Contracting Governments should consider how information on changes in security levels should be promulgated rapidly. Administrations may wish to use NAVTEX messages or Notices to Mariners as the method for notifying such changes in security levels to the ship and to the CSO and SSO. Or, they may wish to consider other methods of communication that provide equivalent or better speed and coverage. Contracting Governments should establish means of notifying PFSOs of changes in security levels. Contracting Governments should compile and maintain the contact details for a list of those who need to be informed of changes in security levels. Whereas the security level need not be regarded as being particularly sensitive, the underlying threat information may be highly sensitive. Contracting Governments should give careful consideration to the type

and detail of the information conveyed and the method by which it is conveyed to SSOs, CSOs and PFSOs.

#### *Contact points and information on port facility security plans*

**4.14** Where a port facility has a PFSP, that fact has to be communicated to the Organization and that information must also be made available to CSOs and SSOs. No further details of the PFSP have to be published other than that it is in place. Contracting Governments should consider establishing either central or regional points of contact, or other means of providing up-to-date information on the locations where PFSPs are in place, together with contact details for the relevant PFSO. The existence of such contact points should be publicized. They could also provide information on the recognized security organizations appointed to act on behalf of the Contracting Government, together with details of the specific responsibility and conditions of authority delegated to such recognized security organizations.

**4.15** In the case of a port that does not have a PFSP (and therefore does not have a PFSO), the central or regional point of contact should be able to identify a suitably qualified person ashore who can arrange for appropriate security measures to be in place, if needed, for the duration of the ship's visit.

**4.16** Contracting Governments should also provide the contact details of Government officers to whom an SSO, a CSO and a PFSO can report security concerns. These Government officers should assess such reports before taking appropriate action. Such reported concerns may have a bearing on the security measures falling under the jurisdiction of another Contracting Government. In that case, the Contracting Governments should consider contacting their counterpart in the other Contracting Government to discuss whether remedial action is appropriate. For this purpose, the contact details of the Government officers should be communicated to the International Maritime Organization.

**4.17** Contracting Governments should also make the information indicated in paragraphs 4.14 to 4.16 available to other Contracting Governments on request.

#### *Identification documents*

**4.18** Contracting Governments are encouraged to issue appropriate identification documents to Government officials entitled to board ships or enter port facilities when performing their official duties and to establish procedures whereby the authenticity of such documents might be verified.

*Fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location*

**4.19** Contracting Governments should consider establishing appropriate security measures for fixed and floating platforms and mobile offshore drilling units on location to allow interaction with ships which are required to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code\*.

*Ships which are not required to comply with part A of this Code*

**4.20** Contracting Governments should consider establishing appropriate security measures to enhance the security of ships to which chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code do not apply and to ensure that any security provisions applying to such ships allow interaction with ships to which part A of this Code applies.

*Threats to ships and other incidents at sea*

**4.21** Contracting Governments should provide general guidance on the measures considered appropriate to reduce the security risk to ships flying their flag when at sea. They should provide specific advice on the action to be taken in accordance with security levels 1 to 3, if:

- .1 there is a change in the security level applying to the ship while it is at sea, e.g. because of the geographical area in which it is operating or relating to the ship itself; and
- .2 there is a security incident or threat thereof involving the ship while at sea.

Contracting Governments should establish the best methods and procedures for these purposes. In the case of an imminent attack, the ship should seek to establish direct communication with those responsible in the flag State for responding to security incidents.

**4.22** Contracting Governments should also establish a point of contact for advice on security for any ship:

- .1 entitled to fly their flag; or
- .2 operating in their territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea.

**4.23** Contracting Governments should offer advice to ships operating in their territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, which could include advice:

- .1 to alter or delay their intended passage;

\* Refer to Establishment of appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships, port facilities, mobile offshore drilling units on location and fixed and floating platforms not covered by chapter XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, adopted by the 2002 SOLAS Conference by resolution 7.

- .2** to navigate on a particular course or proceed to a specific location;
- .3** on the availability of any personnel or equipment that could be placed on the ship;
- .4** to co-ordinate the passage, arrival into port or departure from port, to allow escort by patrol craft or aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopter).

Contracting Governments should remind ships operating in their territorial sea, or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, of any temporary restricted areas that they have published.

**4.24** Contracting Governments should recommend that ships operating in their territorial sea, or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea, implement expeditiously, for the ship's protection and for the protection of other ships in the vicinity, any security measure the Contracting Government may have advised.

**4.25** The plans prepared by the Contracting Governments for the purposes given in paragraph 4.22 should include information on an appropriate point of contact, available on a 24-hour basis, within the Contracting Government including the Administration. These plans should also include information on the circumstances in which the Administration considers assistance should be sought from nearby coastal States, and a procedure for liaison between PFSOs and SSOs.

#### *Alternative security agreements*

**4.26** Contracting Governments, in considering how to implement chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, may conclude one or more agreements with one or more Contracting Governments. The scope of an agreement is limited to short international voyages on fixed routes between port facilities in the territory of the parties to the agreement. When concluding an agreement, and thereafter, the Contracting Governments should consult other Contracting Governments and Administrations with an interest in the effects of the agreement. Ships flying the flag of a State that is not party to the agreement should only be allowed to operate on the fixed routes covered by the agreement if their Administration agrees that the ship should comply with the provisions of the agreement and requires the ship to do so. In no case can such an agreement compromise the level of security of other ships and port facilities not covered by it, and specifically, all ships covered by such an agreement may not conduct ship-to-ship activities with ships not so covered. Any operational interface undertaken by ships covered by the agreement should be covered by it. The operation of each agreement must be continually monitored and amended when the need arises and in any event should be reviewed every 5 years.



### *Equivalent arrangements for port facilities*

**4.27** For certain specific port facilities with limited or special operations but with more than occasional traffic, it may be appropriate to ensure compliance by security measures equivalent to those prescribed in chapter XI-2 and in part A of this Code. This can, in particular, be the case for terminals such as those attached to factories, or quaysides with no frequent operations.

### *Manning level*

**4.28** In establishing the minimum safe manning of a ship, the Administration should take into account\* that the minimum safe manning provisions established by regulation V/14† only address the safe navigation of the ship. The Administration should also take into account any additional workload which may result from the implementation of the SSP and ensure that the ship is sufficiently and effectively manned. In doing so, the Administration should verify that ships are able to implement the hours of rest and other measures to address fatigue which have been promulgated by national law, in the context of all shipboard duties assigned to the various shipboard personnel.

### *Control and compliance measures‡*

#### *General*

**4.29** Regulation XI-2/9 describes the Control and compliance measures applicable to ships under chapter XI-2. It is divided into three distinct sections; control of ships already in a port, control of ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government, and additional provisions applicable to both situations.

**4.30** Regulation XI-2/9.1, Control of ships in port, implements a system for the control of ships while in the port of a foreign country where duly authorized officers of the Contracting Government (“duly authorized officers”) have the right to go on board the ship to verify that the required

\* Refer to Further work by the International Maritime Organization pertaining to enhancement of maritime security, adopted by the 2002 SOLAS Conference by resolution 3, inviting, amongst others, the Organization to review Assembly resolution A.890(21) on Principles of safe manning. This review may also lead to amendments of regulation V/14.

† As was in force on the date of adoption of this Code.

‡ Refer to Further work by the International Maritime Organization pertaining to enhancement of maritime security, adopted by the 2002 SOLAS Conference by resolution 3, inviting, amongst others, the Organization to review Assembly resolutions A.787(19) and A.882(21) on Procedures for port State control.

certificates are in proper order. Then, if there are clear grounds to believe the ship does not comply, control measures such as additional inspections or detention may be taken. This reflects current control systems.\* Regulation XI-2/9.1 builds on such systems and allows for additional measures (including expulsion of a ship from a port to be taken as a control measure) when duly authorized officers have clear grounds for believing that a ship is in non-compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code. Regulation XI-2/9.3 describes the safeguards that promote fair and proportionate implementation of these additional measures.

**4.31** Regulation XI-2/9.2 applies control measures to ensure compliance to ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government and introduces an entirely different concept of control within chapter XI-2, applying to security only. Under this regulation, measures may be implemented prior to the ship entering port, to better ensure security. Just as in regulation XI-2/9.1, this additional control system is based on the concept of clear grounds for believing the ship does not comply with chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and includes significant safeguards in regulations XI-2/9.2.2 and XI-2/9.2.5 as well as in regulation XI-2/9.3.

**4.32** Clear grounds that the ship is not in compliance means evidence or reliable information that the ship does not correspond with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, taking into account the guidance given in this Part of the Code. Such evidence or reliable information may arise from the duly authorized officer's professional judgement or observations gained while verifying the ship's International Ship Security Certificate or Interim International Ship Security Certificate issued in accordance with part A of this Code ("Certificate") or from other sources. Even if a valid Certificate is on board the ship, the duly authorized officers may still have clear grounds for believing that the ship is not in compliance based on their professional judgement.

**4.33** Examples of possible clear grounds under regulations XI-2/9.1 and XI-2/9.2 may include, when relevant:

- .1 evidence from a review of the Certificate that it is not valid or it has expired;
- .2 evidence or reliable information that serious deficiencies exist in the security equipment, documentation or arrangements required by chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code;

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\* See regulation I/19 and regulation IX/6.2 of SOLAS 74 as amended, article 21 of Load Line 66 as modified by the 1988 Load Line Protocol, articles 5 and 6 and regulation 8A of Annex I and regulation 15 of Annex II of MARPOL 73/78 as amended, article X of STCW 78 as amended and IMO Assembly resolutions A.787(19) and A.882(21).

- .3** receipt of a report or complaint which, in the professional judgement of the duly authorized officer, contains reliable information clearly indicating that the ship does not comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code;
- .4** evidence or observation gained by a duly authorized officer using professional judgement that the master or ship's personnel is not familiar with essential shipboard security procedures or cannot carry out drills related to the security of the ship or that such procedures or drills have not been carried out;
- .5** evidence or observation gained by a duly authorized officer using professional judgement that key members of ship's personnel are not able to establish proper communication with any other key members of ship's personnel with security responsibilities on board the ship;
- .6** evidence or reliable information that the ship has embarked persons or loaded stores or goods at a port facility or from another ship where either the port facility or the other ship is in violation of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the ship in question has not completed a Declaration of Security, nor taken appropriate, special or additional security measures or has not maintained appropriate ship security procedures;
- .7** evidence or reliable information that the ship has embarked persons or loaded stores or goods at a port facility or from another source (e.g., another ship or helicopter transfer) where either the port facility or the other source is not required to comply with chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code, and the ship has not taken appropriate, special or additional security measures or has not maintained appropriate security procedures; and
- .8** the ship holding a subsequent, consecutively issued Interim International Ship Security Certificate as described in section A/19.4, and if, in the professional judgement of an officer duly authorized, one of the purposes of the ship or a Company in requesting such a Certificate is to avoid full compliance with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code beyond the period of the initial Interim Certificate as described in section A/19.4.4.

**4.34** The international law implications of regulation XI-2/9 are particularly relevant, and the regulation should be implemented with regulation XI-2/2.4 in mind, as the potential exists for situations where either measures will be taken which fall outside the scope of chapter XI-2, or where rights of affected ships, outside chapter XI-2, should be considered. Thus, regulation XI-2/9 does not prejudice the Contracting Government from taking measures having a basis in, and consistent with, international law to ensure the safety or security of persons, ships, port facilities and other

property in cases where the ship, although in compliance with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, is still considered to present a security risk.

**4.35** When a Contracting Government imposes control measures on a ship, the Administration should, without delay, be contacted with sufficient information to enable the Administration to fully liaise with the Contracting Government.

*Control of ships in port*

**4.36** Where the non-compliance is either a defective item of equipment or faulty documentation leading to the ship's detention and the non-compliance cannot be remedied in the port of inspection, the Contracting Government may allow the ship to sail to another port provided that any conditions agreed between the port States and the Administration or master are met.

*Ships intending to enter the port of another Contracting Government*

**4.37** Regulation XI-2/9.2.1 lists the information Contracting Governments may require from a ship as a condition of entry into port. One item of information listed is confirmation of any special or additional measures taken by the ship during its last 10 calls at a port facility. Examples could include:

- .1 records of the measures taken while visiting a port facility located in the territory of a State which is not a Contracting Government, especially those measures that would normally have been provided by port facilities located in the territories of Contracting Governments; and
- .2 any Declarations of Security that were entered into with port facilities or other ships.

**4.38** Another item of information listed, that may be required as a condition of entry into port, is confirmation that appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during ship-to-ship activity conducted within the period of the last 10 calls at a port facility. It would not normally be required to include records of transfers of pilots or of customs, immigration or security officials nor bunkering, lightering, loading of supplies and unloading of waste by ship within port facilities as these would normally fall within the auspices of the PFSP. Examples of information that might be given include:

- .1 records of the measures taken while engaged in a ship-to-ship activity with a ship flying the flag of a State which is not a Contracting Government, especially those measures that would normally have been provided by ships flying the flag of Contracting Governments;
- .2 records of the measures taken while engaged in a ship-to-ship activity with a ship that is flying the flag of a Contracting Government but is not required to comply with the provisions

of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code, such as a copy of any security certificate issued to that ship under other provisions; and

- .3 in the event that persons or goods rescued at sea are on board, all known information about such persons or goods, including their identities when known and the results of any checks run on behalf of the ship to establish the security status of those rescued. It is not the intention of chapter XI-2 or part A of this Code to delay or prevent the delivery of those in distress at sea to a place of safety. It is the sole intention of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code to provide States with enough appropriate information to maintain their security integrity.

**4.39** Examples of other practical security-related information that may be required as a condition of entry into port in order to assist with ensuring the safety and security of persons, port facilities, ships and other property include:

- .1 information contained in the Continuous Synopsis Record;
- .2 location of the ship at the time the report is made;
- .3 expected time of arrival of the ship in port;
- .4 crew list;
- .5 general description of cargo aboard the ship;
- .6 passenger list; and
- .7 information required to be carried under regulation XI-2/5.

**4.40** Regulation XI-2/9.2.5 allows the master of a ship, upon being informed that the coastal or port State will implement control measures under regulation XI-2/9.2, to withdraw the intention for the ship to enter port. If the master withdraws that intention, regulation XI-2/9 no longer applies, and any other steps that are taken must be based on, and consistent with, international law.

#### *Additional provisions*

**4.41** In all cases where a ship is denied entry or is expelled from a port, all known facts should be communicated to the authorities of relevant States. This communication should consist of the following, when known:

- .1 name of ship, its flag, the Ship Identification Number, call sign, ship type and cargo;
- .2 reason for denying entry or for expulsion from port or port areas;
- .3 if relevant, the nature of any security non-compliance;

- .4 if relevant, details of any attempts made to rectify any non-compliance, including any conditions imposed on the ship for the voyage;
- .5 past port(s) of call and next declared port of call;
- .6 time of departure and likely estimated time of arrival at those ports;
- .7 any instructions given to the ship, e.g., reporting on its route;
- .8 available information on the security level at which the ship is currently operating;
- .9 information regarding any communications the port State has had with the Administration;
- .10 contact point within the port State making the report for the purpose of obtaining further information;
- .11 crew list; and
- .12 any other relevant information.

**4.42** Relevant States to contact should include those along the ship's intended passage to its next port, particularly if the ship intends to enter the territorial sea of that coastal State. Other relevant States could include previous ports of call, so that further information might be obtained and security issues relating to the previous ports resolved.

**4.43** In exercising control and compliance measures, the duly authorized officers should ensure that any measures or steps imposed are proportionate. Such measures or steps should be reasonable and of the minimum severity and duration necessary to rectify or mitigate the non-compliance.

**4.44** The word "delay" in regulation XI-2/9.3.5.1 also refers to situations where, pursuant to actions taken under this regulation, the ship is unduly denied entry into port or the ship is unduly expelled from port.

#### *Non-Party ships and ships below Convention size*

**4.45** With respect to ships flying the flag of a State which is not a Contracting Government to the Convention and not a Party to the 1988 SOLAS Protocol,\* Contracting Governments should not give more favourable treatment to such ships. Accordingly, the requirements of regulation XI-2/9 and the guidance provided in this Part of the Code should be applied to those ships.

**4.46** Ships below Convention size are subject to measures by which States maintain security. Such measures should be taken with due regard to the requirements in chapter XI-2 and the guidance provided in this Part of the Code.

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\* Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974.

## 5 Declaration of Security

### *General*

**5.1** A Declaration of Security (DoS) should be completed when the Contracting Government of the port facility deems it to be necessary or when a ship deems it necessary.

**5.1.1** The need for a DoS may be indicated by the results of the port facility security assessment (PFSA) and the reasons and circumstances in which a DoS is required should be set out in the port facility security plan (PFSP).

**5.1.2** The need for a DoS may be indicated by an Administration for ships entitled to fly its flag or as a result of a ship security assessment (SSA) and should be set out in the ship security plan (SSP).

**5.2** It is likely that a DoS will be requested at higher security levels, when a ship has a higher security level than the port facility, or another ship with which it interfaces, and for ship/port interface or ship-to-ship activities that pose a higher risk to persons, property or the environment for reasons specific to that ship, including its cargo or passengers, or the circumstances at the port facility or a combination of these factors.

**5.2.1** In the case that a ship or an Administration, on behalf of ships entitled to fly its flag, requests completion of a DoS, the PFSO or SSO should acknowledge the request and discuss appropriate security measures.

**5.3** A PFSO may also initiate a DoS prior to ship/port interfaces that are identified in the approved PFSA as being of particular concern. Examples may include embarking or disembarking passengers and the transfer, loading or unloading of dangerous goods or hazardous substances. The PFSA may also identify facilities at or near highly populated areas or economically significant operations that warrant a DoS.

**5.4** The main purpose of a DoS is to ensure agreement is reached between the ship and the port facility or with other ships with which it interfaces as to the respective security measures each will undertake in accordance with the provisions of their respective approved security plans.

**5.4.1** The agreed DoS should be signed and dated by both the port facility and the ship(s), as applicable, to indicate compliance with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code and should include its duration, the relevant security level or levels and the relevant contact details.

**5.4.2** A change in the security level may require that a new or revised DoS be completed.

**5.5** The DoS should be completed in English, French or Spanish or in a language common to both the port facility and the ship or the ships, as applicable.

**5.6** A model DoS is included in appendix 1 to this Part of the Code. This model is for a DoS between a ship and a port facility. If the DoS is to cover two ships this model should be appropriately adjusted.

## **6 Obligations of the Company**

### *General*

**6.1** Regulation XI-2/5 requires the Company to provide the master of the ship with information to meet the requirements of the Company under the provisions of this regulation. This information should include items such as:

- 1** parties responsible for appointing shipboard personnel, such as ship management companies, manning agents, contractors, concessionaries (for example, retail sales outlets, casinos, etc.);
- 2** parties responsible for deciding the employment of the ship, including time or bareboat charterer(s) or any other entity acting in such capacity; and
- 3** in cases when the ship is employed under the terms of a charter party, the contact details of those parties, including time or voyage charterers.

**6.2** In accordance with regulation XI-2/5, the Company is obliged to update and keep this information current as and when changes occur.

**6.3** This information should be in English, French or Spanish language.

**6.4** With respect to ships constructed before 1 July 2004, this information should reflect the actual condition on that date.

**6.5** With respect to ships constructed on or after 1 July 2004 and for ships constructed before 1 July 2004 which were out of service on 1 July 2004, the information should be provided as from the date of entry of the ship into service and should reflect the actual condition on that date.

**6.6** After 1 July 2004, when a ship is withdrawn from service, the information should be provided as from the date of re-entry of the ship into service and should reflect the actual condition on that date.

**6.7** Previously provided information that does not relate to the actual condition on that date need not be retained on board.

**6.8** When the responsibility for the operation of the ship is assumed by another Company, the information relating to the Company which operated the ship is not required to be left on board.

*In addition, other relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.*

## **7 Ship security**

*Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.*



## 8 Ship security assessment

### *Security assessment*

**8.1** The company security officer (CSO) is responsible for ensuring that a ship security assessment (SSA) is carried out for each of the ships in the Company's fleet which is required to comply with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code for which the CSO is responsible. While the CSO need not necessarily personally undertake all the duties associated with the post, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that they are properly performed remains with the individual CSO.

**8.2** Prior to commencing the SSA, the CSO should ensure that advantage is taken of information available on the assessment of threat for the ports at which the ship will call or at which passengers embark or disembark and about the port facilities and their protective measures. The CSO should study previous reports on similar security needs. Where feasible, the CSO should meet with appropriate persons on the ship and in the port facilities to discuss the purpose and methodology of the assessment. The CSO should follow any specific guidance offered by the Contracting Governments.

**8.3** An SSA should address the following elements on board or within the ship:

- .1 physical security;
- .2 structural integrity;
- .3 personnel protection systems;
- .4 procedural policies;
- .5 radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks; and
- .6 other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons, property, or operations on board the ship or within a port facility.

**8.4** Those involved in conducting an SSA should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to:

- .1 knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- .2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- .3 recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
- .4 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
- .5 methods used to cause a security incident;
- .6 effects of explosives on ship's structures and equipment;

- .7 ship security;
- .8 ship/port interface business practices;
- .9 contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response;
- .10 physical security;
- .11 radio and telecommunications systems, including computer systems and networks;
- .12 marine engineering; and
- .13 ship and port operations.

**8.5** The CSO should obtain and record the information required to conduct an assessment, including:

- .1 the general layout of the ship;
- .2 the location of areas which should have restricted access, such as navigation bridge, machinery spaces of category A and other control stations as defined in chapter II-2, etc.;
- .3 the location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship;
- .4 changes in the tide which may have an impact on the vulnerability or security of the ship;
- .5 the cargo spaces and stowage arrangements;
- .6 the locations where the ship's stores and essential maintenance equipment is stored;
- .7 the locations where unaccompanied baggage is stored;
- .8 the emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services;
- .9 the number of ship's personnel, any existing security duties and any existing training requirement practises of the Company;
- .10 existing security and safety equipment for the protection of passengers and ship's personnel;
- .11 escape and evacuation routes and assembly stations which have to be maintained to ensure the orderly and safe emergency evacuation of the ship;
- .12 existing agreements with private security companies providing ship/water-side security services; and
- .13 existing security measures and procedures in effect, including inspection and control procedures, identification systems, surveillance and monitoring equipment, personnel identification documents and communication, alarms, lighting, access control and other appropriate systems.

**8.6** The SSA should examine each identified point of access, including open weather decks, and evaluate its potential for use by individuals who might seek to breach security. This includes points of access available to individuals having legitimate access as well as those who seek to obtain unauthorized entry.

**8.7** The SSA should consider the continuing relevance of the existing security measures and guidance, procedures and operations, under both routine and emergency conditions, and should determine security guidance including:

- .1 the restricted areas;
- .2 the response procedures to fire or other emergency conditions;
- .3 the level of supervision of the ship's personnel, passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, dock workers, etc.;
- .4 the frequency and effectiveness of security patrols;
- .5 the access control systems, including identification systems;
- .6 the security communications systems and procedures;
- .7 the security doors, barriers and lighting; and
- .8 the security and surveillance equipment and systems, if any.

**8.8** The SSA should consider the persons, activities, services and operations that it is important to protect. This includes:

- .1 the ship's personnel;
- .2 passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, port facility personnel, etc.;
- .3 the capacity to maintain safe navigation and emergency response;
- .4 the cargo, particularly dangerous goods or hazardous substances;
- .5 the ship's stores;
- .6 the ship security communication equipment and systems, if any; and
- .7 the ship's security surveillance equipment and systems, if any.

**8.9** The SSA should consider all possible threats, which may include the following types of security incidents:

- .1 damage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility, e.g. by explosive devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism;
- .2 hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board;
- .3 tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship's stores;
- .4 unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways;

- .5 smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;
  - .6 use of the ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident and/or their equipment;
  - .7 use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction;
  - .8 attacks from seaward whilst at berth or at anchor; and
  - .9 attacks whilst at sea.
- 8.10** The SSA should take into account all possible vulnerabilities, which may include:
- .1 conflicts between safety and security measures;
  - .2 conflicts between shipboard duties and security assignments;
  - .3 watchkeeping duties, number of ship's personnel, particularly with implications on crew fatigue, alertness and performance;
  - .4 any identified security training deficiencies; and
  - .5 any security equipment and systems, including communication systems.

**8.11** The CSO and ship security officer (SSO) should always have regard to the effect that security measures may have on ship's personnel who will remain on the ship for long periods. When developing security measures, particular consideration should be given to the convenience, comfort and personal privacy of the ship's personnel and their ability to maintain their effectiveness over long periods.

**8.12** Upon completion of the SSA, a report shall be prepared, consisting of a summary of how the assessment was conducted, a description of each vulnerability found during the assessment and a description of counter-measures that could be used to address each vulnerability. The report shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

**8.13** If the SSA has not been carried out by the Company, the report of the SSA should be reviewed and accepted by the CSO.

#### *On-scene security survey*

**8.14** The on-scene security survey is an integral part of any SSA. The on-scene security survey should examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for:

- .1 ensuring the performance of all ship security duties;
- .2 monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
- .3 controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems;

- .4 monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship;
- .5 controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects (accompanied and unaccompanied baggage and ship's personnel personal effects);
- .6 supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship's stores; and
- .7 ensuring that ship security communication, information, and equipment are readily available.

## 9 Ship security plan

### *General*

**9.1** The company security officer (CSO) has the responsibility of ensuring that a ship security plan (SSP) is prepared and submitted for approval. The content of each individual SSP should vary depending on the particular ship it covers. The ship security assessment (SSA) will have identified the particular features of the ship and the potential threats and vulnerabilities. The preparation of the SSP will require these features to be addressed in detail. Administrations may prepare advice on the preparation and content of a SSP.

**9.2** All SSPs should:

- .1 detail the organizational structure of security for the ship;
- .2 detail the ship's relationships with the Company, port facilities, other ships and relevant authorities with security responsibility;
- .3 detail the communication systems to allow effective continuous communication within the ship and between the ship and others, including port facilities;
- .4 detail the basic security measures for security level 1, both operational and physical, that will always be in place;
- .5 detail the additional security measures that will allow the ship to progress without delay to security level 2 and, when necessary, to security level 3;
- .6 provide for regular review, or audit, of the SSP and for its amendment in response to experience or changing circumstances; and
- .7 detail reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Government's contact points.

**9.3** Preparation of an effective SSP should rest on a thorough assessment of all issues that relate to the security of the ship, including, in particular, a thorough appreciation of the physical and operational characteristics, including the voyage pattern, of the individual ship.

**9.4** All SSPs should be approved by, or on behalf of, the Administration. If an Administration uses a recognized security organization (RSO) to review or approve the SSP, that RSO should not be associated with any other RSO that prepared, or assisted in the preparation of, the plan.

**9.5** CSOs and SSOs should develop procedures to:

- .1 assess the continuing effectiveness of the SSP; and
- .2 prepare amendments of the plan subsequent to its approval.

**9.6** The security measures included in the SSP should be in place when the initial verification for compliance with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code will be carried out. Otherwise the process of issue to the ship of the required International Ship Security Certificate cannot be carried out. If there is any subsequent failure of security equipment or systems, or suspension of a security measure for whatever reason, equivalent temporary security measures should be adopted, notified to, and agreed by the Administration.

#### *Organization and performance of ship security duties*

**9.7** In addition to the guidance given in paragraph 9.2, the SSP should establish the following, which relate to all security levels:

- .1 the duties and responsibilities of all shipboard personnel with a security role;
- .2 the procedures or safeguards necessary to allow such continuous communications to be maintained at all times;
- .3 the procedures needed to assess the continuing effectiveness of security procedures and any security and surveillance equipment and systems, including procedures for identifying and responding to equipment or systems failure or malfunction;
- .4 the procedures and practices to protect security-sensitive information held in paper or electronic format;
- .5 the type and maintenance requirements of security and surveillance equipment and systems, if any;
- .6 the procedures to ensure the timely submission, and assessment, of reports relating to possible breaches of security or security concerns; and
- .7 procedures to establish, maintain and update an inventory of any dangerous goods or hazardous substances carried on board, including their location.

**9.8** The remainder of section 9 addresses specifically the security measures that could be taken at each security level covering:

- .1 access to the ship by ship's personnel, passengers, visitors, etc.;
- .2 restricted areas on the ship;

- .3 handling of cargo;
- .4 delivery of ship's stores;
- .5 handling unaccompanied baggage; and
- .6 monitoring the security of the ship.

### *Access to the ship*

**9.9** The SSP should establish the security measures covering all means of access to the ship identified in the SSA. This should include any:

- .1 access ladders;
- .2 access gangways;
- .3 access ramps;
- .4 access doors, sidescuttles, windows and ports;
- .5 mooring lines and anchor chains; and
- .6 cranes and hoisting gear.

**9.10** For each of these the SSP should identify the appropriate locations where access restrictions or prohibitions should be applied for each of the security levels. For each security level the SSP should establish the type of restriction or prohibition to be applied and the means of enforcing them.

**9.11** The SSP should establish for each security level the means of identification required to allow access to the ship and for individuals to remain on the ship without challenge. This may involve developing an appropriate identification system, allowing for permanent and temporary identifications for ship's personnel and for visitors respectively. Any ship identification system should, when it is practicable to do so, be co-ordinated with that applying to the port facility. Passengers should be able to prove their identity by boarding passes, tickets, etc., but should not be permitted access to restricted areas unless supervised. The SSP should establish provisions to ensure that the identification systems are regularly updated, and that abuse of procedures should be subject to disciplinary action.

**9.12** Those unwilling or unable to establish their identity and/or to confirm the purpose of their visit when requested to do so should be denied access to the ship and their attempt to obtain access should be reported, as appropriate, to the SSO, the CSO, the PFSO and to the national or local authorities with security responsibilities.

**9.13** The SSP should establish the frequency of application of any access controls, particularly if they are to be applied on a random, or occasional, basis.

*Security level 1*

**9.14** At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to control access to the ship, where the following may be applied:

- .1 checking the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirming their reasons for doing so by checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger tickets, boarding passes, work orders, etc.;
- .2 in liaison with the port facility, the ship should ensure that designated secure areas are established in which inspections and searching of persons, baggage (including carry-on items), personal effects, vehicles and their contents can take place;
- .3 in liaison with the port facility, the ship should ensure that vehicles destined to be loaded on board car carriers, ro-ro and other passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP;
- .4 segregating checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons and their personal effects;
- .5 segregating embarking from disembarking passengers;
- .6 identifying access points that should be secured or attended to prevent unauthorized access;
- .7 securing, by locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining areas to which passengers and visitors have access; and
- .8 providing security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and the need for vigilance.

**9.15** At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship should be liable to search. The frequency of such searches, including random searches, should be specified in the approved SSP and should be specifically approved by the Administration. Such searches may best be undertaken by the port facility in close co-operation with the ship and in close proximity to it. Unless there are clear security grounds for doing so, members of the ship's personnel should not be required to search their colleagues or their personal effects. Any such search shall be undertaken in a manner which fully takes into account the human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.

*Security level 2*

**9.16** At security level 2, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to protect against a heightened risk of a security incident to ensure higher vigilance and tighter control, which may include:

- .1 assigning additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent hours to deter unauthorized access;



- .2 limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed and the means of adequately securing them;
- .3 deterring waterside access to the ship, including, for example, liaison with the port facility, provision of boat patrols;
- .4 establishing a restricted area on the shore side of the ship, in close co-operation with the port facility;
- .5 increasing the frequency and detail of searches of persons, personal effects, and vehicles being embarked or loaded onto the ship;
- .6 escorting visitors on the ship;
- .7 providing additional specific security briefings to all ship personnel on any identified threats, re-emphasizing the procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities and stressing the need for increased vigilance; and
- .8 carrying out a full or partial search of the ship.

### *Security level 3*

**9.17** At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:

- .1 limiting access to a single, controlled, access point;
- .2 granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat thereof;
- .3 directing persons on board;
- .4 suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;
- .5 suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries, etc.;
- .6 evacuation of the ship;
- .7 movement of the ship; and
- .8 preparing for a full or partial search of the ship.

### *Restricted areas on the ship*

**9.18** The SSP should identify the restricted areas to be established on the ship, specify their extent, times of application, the security measures to be taken to control access to them and those to be taken to control activities within them. The purposes of restricted areas are to:

- .1 prevent unauthorized access;

- .2 protect passengers, ship's personnel, and personnel from port facilities or other agencies authorized to be on board the ship;
- .3 protect security-sensitive areas within the ship; and
- .4 protect cargo and ship's stores from tampering.

**9.19** The SSP should ensure that there are clearly established policies and practices to control access to all restricted areas.

**9.20** The SSP should provide that all restricted areas should be clearly marked, indicating that access to the area is restricted and that unauthorized presence within the area constitutes a breach of security.

**9.21** Restricted areas may include:

- .1 navigation bridge, machinery spaces of category A and other control stations as defined in chapter II-2;
- .2 spaces containing security and surveillance equipment and systems and their controls and lighting system controls;
- .3 ventilation and air-conditioning systems and other similar spaces;
- .4 spaces with access to potable water tanks, pumps, or manifolds;
- .5 spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances;
- .6 spaces containing cargo pumps and their controls;
- .7 cargo spaces and spaces containing ship's stores;
- .8 crew accommodation; and
- .9 any other areas as determined by the CSO, through the SSA, to which access must be restricted to maintain the security of the ship.

#### *Security level 1*

**9.22** At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to restricted areas, which may include:

- .1 locking or securing access points;
- .2 using surveillance equipment to monitor the areas;
- .3 using guards or patrols; and
- .4 using automatic intrusion-detection devices to alert the ship's personnel of unauthorized access.

#### *Security level 2*

**9.23** At security level 2, the frequency and intensity of the monitoring of, and control of access to, restricted areas should be increased to ensure that

only authorized persons have access. The SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied, which may include:

- .1 establishing restricted areas adjacent to access points;
- .2 continuously monitoring surveillance equipment; and
- .3 dedicating additional personnel to guard and patrol restricted areas.

#### *Security level 3*

**9.24** At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:

- .1 setting up of additional restricted areas on the ship in proximity to the security incident, or the believed location of the security threat, to which access is denied; and
- .2 searching of restricted areas as part of a search of the ship.

#### *Handling of cargo*

**9.25** The security measures relating to cargo handling should:

- .1 prevent tampering; and
- .2 prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored on board the ship.

**9.26** The security measures, some of which may have to be applied in liaison with the port facility, should include inventory control procedures at access points to the ship. Once on board the ship, cargo should be capable of being identified as having been approved for loading onto the ship. In addition, security measures should be developed to ensure that cargo, once on board, is not tampered with.

#### *Security level 1*

**9.27** At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during cargo handling, which may include:

- .1 routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces prior to, and during, cargo handling operations;
- .2 checks to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation;
- .3 ensuring, in liaison with the port facility, that vehicles to be loaded on board car carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships are subjected to search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP; and
- .4 checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.

**9.28** Checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means:

- .1 visual and physical examination; and
- .2 using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs.

**9.29** When there are regular or repeated cargo movements, the CSO or SSO may, in consultation with the port facility, agree arrangements with shippers or others responsible for such cargo covering off-site checking, sealing, scheduling, supporting documentation, etc. Such arrangements should be communicated to and agreed with the PFSO concerned.

### *Security level 2*

**9.30** At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied during cargo handling, which may include:

- .1 detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces;
- .2 intensified checks to ensure that only the intended cargo is loaded;
- .3 intensified searching of vehicles to be loaded on car carriers, ro-ro and passenger ships; and
- .4 increased frequency and detail in checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering.

**9.31** Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by the following means:

- .1 increasing the frequency and detail of visual and physical examination;
- .2 increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs; and
- .3 co-ordinating enhanced security measures with the shipper or other responsible party in accordance with an established agreement and procedures.

### *Security level 3*

**9.32** At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:

- .1 suspending the loading or unloading of cargo; and
- .2 verifying the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances carried on board, if any, and their location.

*Delivery of ship's stores*

**9.33** The security measures relating to the delivery of ship's stores should:

- .1 ensure checking of ship's stores and package integrity;
- .2 prevent ship's stores from being accepted without inspection;
- .3 prevent tampering; and
- .4 prevent ship's stores from being accepted unless ordered.

**9.34** For ships regularly using the port facility, it may be appropriate to establish procedures involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering notification and timing of deliveries and their documentation. There should always be some way of confirming that stores presented for delivery are accompanied by evidence that they have been ordered by the ship.

*Security level 1*

**9.35** At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied during delivery of ship's stores, which may include:

- .1 checking to ensure stores match the order prior to being loaded on board; and
- .2 ensuring immediate secure stowage of ship's stores.

*Security level 2*

**9.36** At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied during delivery of ship's stores by exercising checks prior to receiving stores on board and intensifying inspections.

*Security level 3*

**9.37** At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:

- .1 subjecting ship's stores to more extensive checking;
- .2 preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of ship's stores; and
- .3 refusal to accept ship's stores on board the ship.

*Handling unaccompanied baggage*

**9.38** The SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to ensure that unaccompanied baggage (i.e. any baggage, including personal effects, which is not with the passenger or member of ship's personnel at the point

of inspection or search) is identified and subjected to appropriate screening, including searching, before it is accepted on board the ship. It is not envisaged that such baggage will be subjected to screening by both the ship and the port facility, and in cases where both are suitably equipped, the responsibility for screening should rest with the port facility. Close co-operation with the port facility is essential and steps should be taken to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is handled securely after screening.

#### *Security level 1*

**9.39** At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is screened or searched up to and including 100%, which may include use of x-ray screening.

#### *Security level 2*

**9.40** At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage, which should include 100% x-ray screening of all unaccompanied baggage.

#### *Security level 3*

**9.41** At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:

- .1 subjecting such baggage to more extensive screening, for example x-raying it from at least two different angles;
- .2 preparation for restriction or suspension of handling of unaccompanied baggage; and
- .3 refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage on board the ship.

#### *Monitoring the security of the ship*

**9.42** The ship should have the capability to monitor the ship, the restricted areas on board and areas surrounding the ship. Such monitoring capabilities may include use of:

- .1 lighting;
- .2 watchkeepers, security guards and deck watches, including patrols; and
- .3 automatic intrusion-detection devices and surveillance equipment.

**9.43** When used, automatic intrusion-detection devices should activate an audible and/or visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or monitored.

**9.44** The SSP should establish the procedures and equipment needed at each security level and the means of ensuring that monitoring equipment will be able to perform continually, including consideration of the possible effects of weather conditions or of power disruptions.

#### *Security level 1*

**9.45** At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied, which may be a combination of lighting, watchkeepers, security guards or use of security and surveillance equipment to allow ship's security personnel to observe the ship in general, and barriers and restricted areas in particular.

**9.46** The ship's deck and access points to the ship should be illuminated during hours of darkness and periods of low visibility while conducting ship/port interface activities or at a port facility or anchorage when necessary. While under way, when necessary, ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard to the provisions of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea in force. The following should be considered when establishing the appropriate level and location of lighting:

- .1 the ship's personnel should be able to detect activities beyond the ship, on both the shore side and the water side;
- .2 coverage should include the area on and around the ship;
- .3 coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points; and
- .4 coverage may be provided through co-ordination with the port facility.

#### *Security level 2*

**9.47** At security level 2, the SSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied to enhance the monitoring and surveillance capabilities, which may include:

- .1 increasing the frequency and detail of security patrols;
- .2 increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting or the use of security and surveillance equipment;
- .3 assigning additional personnel as security look-outs; and
- .4 ensuring co-ordination with water-side boat patrols, and foot or vehicle patrols on the shore side, when provided.

**9.48** Additional lighting may be necessary to protect against a heightened risk of a security incident. When necessary, the additional lighting requirements may be accomplished by co-ordinating with the port facility to provide additional shoreside lighting.

*Security level 3*

**9.49** At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The SSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the ship, in close co-operation with those responding and the port facility, which may include:

- .1 switching on of all lighting on, or illuminating the vicinity of, the ship;
- .2 switching on of all on-board surveillance equipment capable of recording activities on, or in the vicinity of, the ship;
- .3 maximizing the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to record;
- .4 preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of the ship; and
- .5 initiation of measures, including the slow revolution of the ship's propellers, if practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of the ship.

*Differing security levels*

**9.50** The SSP should establish details of the procedures and security measures the ship could adopt if the ship is at a higher security level than that applying to a port facility.

*Activities not covered by the Code*

**9.51** The SSP should establish details of the procedures and security measures the ship should apply when:

- .1 it is at a port of a State which is not a Contracting Government;
- .2 it is interfacing with a ship to which this Code does not apply\*;
- .3 it is interfacing with fixed or floating platforms or a mobile drilling unit on location; or
- .4 it is interfacing with a port or port facility which is not required to comply with chapter XI-2 and part A of this Code.

*Declarations of Security*

**9.52** The SSP should detail how requests for Declarations of Security from a port facility will be handled and the circumstances under which the ship itself should request a DoS.

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\* Refer to Further work by the International Maritime Organization pertaining to the enhancement of maritime security and to Establishment of appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships, port facilities, mobile offshore drilling units on location and fixed and floating platforms not covered by chapter XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, adopted by the 2002 SOLAS Conference by resolutions 3 and 7 respectively.



### *Audit and review*

**9.53** The SSP should establish how the CSO and the SSO intend to audit the continued effectiveness of the SSP and the procedure to be followed to review, update or amend the SSP.

## **10 Records**

### *General*

**10.1** Records should be available to duly authorized officers of Contracting Governments to verify that the provisions of ship security plans are being implemented.

**10.2** Records may be kept in any format but should be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

## **11 Company security officer**

*Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.*

## **12 Ship security officer**

*Relevant guidance is provided under sections 8, 9 and 13.*

## **13 Training, drills and exercises on ship security**

### *Training*

**13.1** The company security officer (CSO) and appropriate shore-based Company personnel, and the ship security officer (SSO), should have knowledge of, and receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate:

- .1** security administration;
- .2** relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations;
- .3** relevant Government legislation and regulations;
- .4** responsibilities and functions of other security organizations;
- .5** methodology of ship security assessment;
- .6** methods of ship security surveys and inspections;
- .7** ship and port operations and conditions;
- .8** ship and port facility security measures;
- .9** emergency preparedness and response and contingency planning;
- .10** instruction techniques for security training and education, including security measures and procedures;

- .11 handling sensitive security-related information and security-related communications;
- .12 knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- .13 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- .14 recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
- .15 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
- .16 security equipment and systems and their operational limitations;
- .17 methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring;
- .18 methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections;
- .19 security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with port facilities; and
- .20 assessment of security drills and exercises.

**13.2** In addition, the SSO should have adequate knowledge of, and receive training in, some or all of the following, as appropriate:

- .1 the layout of the ship;
- .2 the ship security plan (SSP) and related procedures (including scenario-based training on how to respond);
- .3 crowd management and control techniques;
- .4 operations of security equipment and systems; and
- .5 testing, calibration and at-sea maintenance of security equipment and systems.

**13.3** Shipboard personnel having specific security duties should have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties, including, as appropriate:

- .1 knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- .2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- .3 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
- .4 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
- .5 crowd management and control techniques;
- .6 security-related communications;

- .7 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans;
  - .8 operations of security equipment and systems;
  - .9 testing, calibration and at-sea maintenance of security equipment and systems;
  - .10 inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and
  - .11 methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and ship's stores.
- 13.4** All other shipboard personnel should have sufficient knowledge of and be familiar with relevant provisions of the SSP, including:
- .1 the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels;
  - .2 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans;
  - .3 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
  - .4 recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; and
  - .5 techniques used to circumvent security measures.

#### *Drills and exercises*

**13.5** The objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that shipboard personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties at all security levels and the identification of any security-related deficiencies which need to be addressed.

**13.6** To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the ship security plan, drills should be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, in cases where more than 25% of the ship's personnel has been changed, at any one time, with personnel that has not previously participated in any drill on that ship within the last 3 months, a drill should be conducted within one week of the change. These drills should test individual elements of the plan such as those security threats listed in paragraph 8.9.

**13.7** Various types of exercises, which may include participation of company security officers, port facility security officers, relevant authorities of Contracting Governments as well as ship security officers, if available, should be carried out at least once each calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. These exercises should test communications, co-ordination, resource availability, and response. These exercises may be:

- .1 full-scale or live;
- .2 tabletop simulation or seminar; or

- .3 combined with other exercises held, such as search and rescue or emergency response exercises.

**13.8** Company participation in an exercise with another Contracting Government should be recognized by the Administration.

#### **14 Port facility security**

*Relevant guidance is provided under sections 15, 16 and 18.*

#### **15 Port facility security assessment**

##### *General*

**15.1** The port facility security assessment (PFSA) may be conducted by a recognized security organization (RSO). However, approval of a completed PFSA should only be given by the relevant Contracting Government.

**15.2** If a Contracting Government uses a RSO to review or verify compliance of the PFSA, the RSO should not be associated with any other RSO that prepared or assisted in the preparation of that assessment.

**15.3** A PFSA should address the following elements within a port facility:

- .1 physical security;
- .2 structural integrity;
- .3 personnel protection systems;
- .4 procedural policies;
- .5 radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks;
- .6 relevant transportation infrastructure;
- .7 utilities; and
- .8 other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons, property, or operations within the port facility.

**15.4** Those involved in a PFSA should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to:

- .1 knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- .2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- .3 recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
- .4 techniques used to circumvent security measures;

- .5 methods used to cause a security incident;
- .6 effects of explosives on structures and port facility services;
- .7 port facility security;
- .8 port business practices;
- .9 contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response;
- .10 physical security measures, e.g. fences;
- .11 radio and telecommunications systems, including computer systems and networks;
- .12 transport and civil engineering; and
- .13 ship and port operations.

*Identification and evaluation of important assets and infrastructure it is important to protect*

**15.5** The identification and evaluation of important assets and infrastructure is a process through which the relative importance of structures and installations to the functioning of the port facility can be established. This identification and evaluation process is important because it provides a basis for focusing mitigation strategies on those assets and structures which it is more important to protect from a security incident. This process should take into account potential loss of life, the economic significance of the port, symbolic value, and the presence of Government installations.

**15.6** Identification and evaluation of assets and infrastructure should be used to prioritize their relative importance for protection. The primary concern should be avoidance of death or injury. It is also important to consider whether the port facility, structure or installation can continue to function without the asset, and the extent to which rapid re-establishment of normal functioning is possible.

**15.7** Assets and infrastructure that should be considered important to protect may include:

- .1 accesses, entrances, approaches, and anchorages, manoeuvring and berthing areas;
- .2 cargo facilities, terminals, storage areas, and cargo handling equipment;
- .3 systems such as electrical distribution systems, radio and telecommunication systems and computer systems and networks;
- .4 port vessel traffic management systems and aids to navigation;
- .5 power plants, cargo transfer piping, and water supplies;
- .6 bridges, railways, roads;

- .7 port service vessels, including pilot boats, tugs, lighters, etc.;
- .8 security and surveillance equipment and systems; and
- .9 the waters adjacent to the port facility.

**15.8** The clear identification of assets and infrastructure is essential to the evaluation of the port facility's security requirements, the prioritization of protective measures, and decisions concerning the allocation of resources to better protect the port facility. The process may involve consultation with the relevant authorities relating to structures adjacent to the port facility which could cause damage within the facility or be used for the purpose of causing damage to the facility or for illicit observation of the facility or for diverting attention.

*Identification of the possible threats to the assets and infrastructure and the likelihood of their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures*

**15.9** Possible acts that could threaten the security of assets and infrastructure, and the methods of carrying out those acts, should be identified to evaluate the vulnerability of a given asset or location to a security incident, and to establish and prioritize security requirements to enable planning and resource allocations. Identification and evaluation of each potential act and its method should be based on various factors, including threat assessments by Government agencies. By identifying and assessing threats, those conducting the assessment do not have to rely on worst-case scenarios to guide planning and resource allocations.

**15.10** The PFSA should include an assessment undertaken in consultation with the relevant national security organizations to determine:

- .1 any particular aspects of the port facility, including the vessel traffic using the facility, which make it likely to be the target of an attack;
- .2 the likely consequences in terms of loss of life, damage to property and economic disruption, including disruption to transport systems, of an attack on, or at, the port facility;
- .3 the capability and intent of those likely to mount such an attack; and
- .4 the possible type, or types, of attack,

producing an overall assessment of the level of risk against which security measures have to be developed.

**15.11** The PFSA should consider all possible threats, which may include the following types of security incidents:

- .1 damage to, or destruction of, the port facility or of the ship, e.g. by explosive devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism;

- .2 hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board;
- .3 tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship's stores;
- .4 unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways;
- .5 smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;
- .6 use of the ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident and their equipment;
- .7 use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction;
- .8 blockage of port entrances, locks, approaches, etc.; and
- .9 nuclear, biological and chemical attack.

**15.12** The process should involve consultation with the relevant authorities relating to structures adjacent to the port facility which could cause damage within the facility or be used for the purpose of causing damage to the facility or for illicit observation of the facility or for diverting attention.

*Identification, selection, and prioritization of countermeasures and procedural changes and their level of effectiveness in reducing vulnerability*

**15.13** The identification and prioritization of countermeasures is designed to ensure that the most effective security measures are employed to reduce the vulnerability of a port facility or ship/port interface to the possible threats.

**15.14** Security measures should be selected on the basis of factors such as whether they reduce the probability of an attack and should be evaluated using information that includes:

- .1 security surveys, inspections and audits;
- .2 consultation with port facility owners and operators, and owners/operators of adjacent structures if appropriate;
- .3 historical information on security incidents; and
- .4 operations within the port facility.

*Identification of vulnerabilities*

**15.15** Identification of vulnerabilities in physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes, or other areas that may lead to a security incident can be used to establish options to eliminate or mitigate those vulnerabilities. For example, an analysis might reveal vulnerabilities in a port facility's security systems or unprotected infrastructure such as water supplies, bridges, etc. that could be resolved through physical measures, e.g. permanent barriers, alarms, surveillance equipment, etc.

**15.16** Identification of vulnerabilities should include consideration of:

- .1 water-side and shore-side access to the port facility and ships berthing at the facility;
- .2 structural integrity of the piers, facilities, and associated structures;
- .3 existing security measures and procedures, including identification systems;
- .4 existing security measures and procedures relating to port services and utilities;
- .5 measures to protect radio and telecommunication equipment, port services and utilities, including computer systems and networks;
- .6 adjacent areas that may be exploited during, or for, an attack;
- .7 existing agreements with private security companies providing water-side/shore-side security services;
- .8 any conflicting policies between safety and security measures and procedures;
- .9 any conflicting port facility and security duty assignments;
- .10 any enforcement and personnel constraints;
- .11 any deficiencies identified during training and drills; and
- .12 any deficiencies identified during daily operation, following incidents or alerts, the report of security concerns, the exercise of control measures, audits, etc.

**16 Port facility security plan**

*General*

**16.1** Preparation of the port facility security plan (PFSP) is the responsibility of the port facility security officer (PFSO). While the PFSO need not necessarily personally undertake all the duties associated with the post, the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that they are properly performed remains with the individual PFSO.

**16.2** The content of each individual PFSP should vary depending on the particular circumstances of the port facility, or facilities, it covers. The port facility security assessment (PFSA) will have identified the particular features of the port facility, and of the potential security risks, that have led to the need to appoint a PFSO and to prepare a PFSP. The preparation of the PFSP will require these features, and other local or national security considerations, to be addressed in the PFSP and for appropriate security measures to be established so as to minimize the likelihood of a breach of



security and the consequences of potential risks. Contracting Governments may prepare advice on the preparation and content of a PFSP.

**16.3** All PFSPs should:

- .1** detail the security organization of the port facility;
- .2** detail the organization's links with other relevant authorities and the necessary communication systems to allow the effective continuous operation of the organization and its links with others, including ships in port;
- .3** detail the basic security level 1 measures, both operational and physical, that will be in place;
- .4** detail the additional security measures that will allow the port facility to progress without delay to security level 2 and, when necessary, to security level 3;
- .5** provide for regular review, or audit, of the PFSP and for its amendment in response to experience or changing circumstances; and
- .6** detail reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Government's contact points.

**16.4** Preparation of an effective PFSP will rest on a thorough assessment of all issues that relate to the security of the port facility, including, in particular, a thorough appreciation of the physical and operational characteristics of the individual port facility.

**16.5** Contracting Governments should approve the PFSPs of the port facilities under their jurisdiction. Contracting Governments should develop procedures to assess the continuing effectiveness of each PFSP and may require amendment of the PFSP prior to its initial approval or subsequent to its approval. The PFSP should make provision for the retention of records of security incidents and threats, reviews, audits, training, drills and exercises as evidence of compliance with those requirements.

**16.6** The security measures included in the PFSP should be in place within a reasonable period of the PFSP's approval and the PFSP should establish when each measure will be in place. If there is likely to be any delay in their provision, this should be discussed with the Contracting Government responsible for approval of the PFSP and satisfactory alternative temporary security measures that provide an equivalent level of security should be agreed to cover any interim period.

**16.7** The use of firearms on or near ships and in port facilities may pose particular and significant safety risks, in particular in connection with certain dangerous or hazardous substances, and should be considered very carefully. In the event that a Contracting Government decides that it is necessary to use armed personnel in these areas, that Contracting Government should

ensure that these personnel are duly authorized and trained in the use of their weapons and that they are aware of the specific risks to safety that are present in these areas. If a Contracting Government authorizes the use of firearms they should issue specific safety guidelines on their use. The PFSP should contain specific guidance on this matter, in particular with regard to its application to ships carrying dangerous goods or hazardous substances.

*Organization and performance of port facility security duties*

**16.8** In addition to the guidance given under paragraph 16.3, the PFSP should establish the following, which relate to all security levels:

- .1 the role and structure of the port facility security organization;
- .2 the duties, responsibilities and training requirements of all port facility personnel with a security role and the performance measures needed to allow their individual effectiveness to be assessed;
- .3 the port facility security organization's links with other national or local authorities with security responsibilities;
- .4 the communication systems provided to allow effective and continuous communication between port facility security personnel, ships in port and, when appropriate, with national or local authorities with security responsibilities;
- .5 the procedures or safeguards necessary to allow such continuous communications to be maintained at all times;
- .6 the procedures and practices to protect security-sensitive information held in paper or electronic format;
- .7 the procedures to assess the continuing effectiveness of security measures, procedures and equipment, including identification of, and response to, equipment failure or malfunction;
- .8 the procedures to allow the submission, and assessment, of reports relating to possible breaches of security or security concerns;
- .9 procedures relating to cargo handling;
- .10 procedures covering the delivery of ship's stores;
- .11 the procedures to maintain, and update, records of dangerous goods and hazardous substances and their location within the port facility;
- .12 the means of alerting and obtaining the services of waterside patrols and specialist search teams, including bomb searches and underwater searches;

- .13 the procedures for assisting ship security officers in confirming the identity of those seeking to board the ship when requested; and
  - .14 the procedures for facilitating shore leave for ship's personnel or personnel changes, as well as access of visitors to the ship, including representatives of seafarers' welfare and labour organizations.
- 16.9** The remainder of section 16 addresses specifically the security measures that could be taken at each security level covering:
- .1 access to the port facility;
  - .2 restricted areas within the port facility;
  - .3 handling of cargo;
  - .4 delivery of ship's stores;
  - .5 handling unaccompanied baggage; and
  - .6 monitoring the security of the port facility.

#### *Access to the port facility*

- 16.10** The PFSP should establish the security measures covering all means of access to the port facility identified in the PFSA.
- 16.11** For each of these the PFSP should identify the appropriate locations where access restrictions or prohibitions should be applied for each of the security levels. For each security level the PFSP should specify the type of restriction or prohibition to be applied and the means of enforcing them.
- 16.12** The PFSP should establish for each security level the means of identification required to allow access to the port facility and for individuals to remain within the port facility without challenge. This may involve developing an appropriate identification system, allowing for permanent and temporary identifications for port facility personnel and for visitors respectively. Any port facility identification system should, when it is practicable to do so, be co-ordinated with that applying to ships that regularly use the port facility. Passengers should be able to prove their identity by boarding passes, tickets, etc., but should not be permitted access to restricted areas unless supervised. The PFSP should establish provisions to ensure that the identification systems are regularly updated, and that abuse of procedures should be subject to disciplinary action.
- 16.13** Those unwilling or unable to establish their identity and/or to confirm the purpose of their visit when requested to do so should be denied access to the port facility and their attempt to obtain access should be reported to the PFSA and to the national or local authorities with security responsibilities.

**16.14** The PFSP should identify the locations where persons, personal effects, and vehicle searches are to be undertaken. Such locations should be covered to facilitate continuous operation, regardless of prevailing weather conditions, in accordance with the frequency laid down in the PFSP. Once subjected to search, persons, personal effects and vehicles should proceed directly to the restricted holding, embarkation or car loading areas.

**16.15** The PFSP should establish separate locations for checked and unchecked persons and their effects and if possible separate areas for embarking/disembarking passengers, ship's personnel and their effects to ensure that unchecked persons are not able to come in contact with checked persons.

**16.16** The PFSP should establish the frequency of application of any access controls, particularly if they are to be applied on a random, or occasional, basis.

#### *Security level 1*

**16.17** At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the control points where the following security measures may be applied:

- .1 restricted areas, which should be bounded by fencing or other barriers to a standard which should be approved by the Contracting Government;
- .2 checking identity of all persons seeking entry to the port facility in connection with a ship, including passengers, ship's personnel and visitors, and confirming their reasons for doing so by checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger tickets, boarding passes, work orders, etc.;
- .3 checking vehicles used by those seeking entry to the port facility in connection with a ship;
- .4 verification of the identity of port facility personnel and those employed within the port facility and their vehicles;
- .5 restricting access to exclude those not employed by the port facility or working within it, if they are unable to establish their identity;
- .6 undertaking searches of persons, personal effects, vehicles and their contents; and
- .7 identification of any access points not in regular use, which should be permanently closed and locked.

**16.18** At security level 1, all those seeking access to the port facility should be liable to search. The frequency of such searches, including random searches, should be specified in the approved PFSP and should be specifically approved by the Contracting Government. Unless there are

clear security grounds for doing so, members of the ship's personnel should not be required to search their colleagues or their personal effects. Any such search shall be undertaken in a manner which fully takes into account the human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.

### *Security level 2*

**16.19** At security level 2, the PFSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied, which may include:

- .1 assigning additional personnel to guard access points and patrol perimeter barriers;
- .2 limiting the number of access points to the port facility, and identifying those to be closed and the means of adequately securing them;
- .3 providing for means of impeding movement through the remaining access points, e.g. security barriers;
- .4 increasing the frequency of searches of persons, personal effects, and vehicles;
- .5 denying access to visitors who are unable to provide a verifiable justification for seeking access to the port facility; and
- .6 using patrol vessels to enhance water-side security.

### *Security level 3*

**16.20** At security level 3, the port facility should comply with instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the port facility, in close co-operation with those responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

- .1 suspension of access to all, or part, of the port facility;
- .2 granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat thereof;
- .3 suspension of pedestrian or vehicular movement within all, or part, of the port facility;
- .4 increased security patrols within the port facility, if appropriate;
- .5 suspension of port operations within all, or part, of the port facility;
- .6 direction of vessel movements relating to all, or part, of the port facility; and
- .7 evacuation of all, or part, of the port facility.

**Restricted areas within the port facility**

**16.21** The PFSP should identify the restricted areas to be established within the port facility and specify their extent, times of application, the security measures to be taken to control access to them and those to be taken to control activities within them. This should also include, in appropriate circumstances, measures to ensure that temporary restricted areas are security swept both before and after that area is established. The purpose of restricted areas is to:

- .1 protect passengers, ship's personnel, port facility personnel and visitors, including those visiting in connection with a ship;
- .2 protect the port facility;
- .3 protect ships using, and serving, the port facility;
- .4 protect security-sensitive locations and areas within the port facility;
- .5 protect security and surveillance equipment and systems; and
- .6 protect cargo and ship's stores from tampering.

**16.22** The PFSP should ensure that all restricted areas have clearly established security measures to control:

- .1 access by individuals;
- .2 the entry, parking, loading and unloading of vehicles;
- .3 movement and storage of cargo and ship's stores; and
- .4 unaccompanied baggage or personal effects.

**16.23** The PFSP should provide that all restricted areas should be clearly marked, indicating that access to the area is restricted and that unauthorized presence within the area constitutes a breach of security.

**16.24** When automatic intrusion-detection devices are installed they should alert a control centre which can respond to the triggering of an alarm.

**16.25** Restricted areas may include:

- .1 shore- and water-side areas immediately adjacent to the ship;
- .2 embarkation and disembarkation areas, passenger and ship's personnel holding and processing areas, including search points;
- .3 areas where loading, unloading or storage of cargo and stores is undertaken;
- .4 locations where security-sensitive information, including cargo documentation, is held;
- .5 areas where dangerous goods and hazardous substances are held;

- .6 vessel traffic management system control rooms, aids to navigation and port control buildings, including security and surveillance control rooms;
  - .7 areas where security and surveillance equipment are stored or located;
  - .8 essential electrical, radio and telecommunication, water and other utility installations; and
  - .9 other locations in the port facility where access by vessels, vehicles and individuals should be restricted.
- 16.26** The security measures may extend, with the agreement of the relevant authorities, to restrictions on unauthorized access to structures from which the port facility can be observed.

#### *Security level 1*

**16.27** At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied to restricted areas, which may include:

- .1 provision of permanent or temporary barriers to surround the restricted area, whose standard should be accepted by the Contracting Government;
- .2 provision of access points where access can be controlled by security guards when in operation and which can be effectively locked or barred when not in use;
- .3 providing passes which must be displayed to identify individual's entitlement to be within the restricted area;
- .4 clearly marking vehicles allowed access to restricted areas;
- .5 providing guards and patrols;
- .6 providing automatic intrusion-detection devices, or surveillance equipment or systems to detect unauthorized access into, or movement within, restricted areas; and
- .7 control of the movement of vessels in the vicinity of ships using the port facility.

#### *Security level 2*

**16.28** At security level 2, the PFSP should establish the enhancement of the frequency and intensity of the monitoring of, and control of access to, restricted areas. The PFSP should establish the additional security measures, which may include:

- .1 enhancing the effectiveness of the barriers or fencing surrounding restricted areas, including the use of patrols or automatic intrusion-detection devices;

- .2 reducing the number of access points to restricted areas and enhancing the controls applied at the remaining accesses;
- .3 restrictions on parking adjacent to berthed ships;
- .4 further restricting access to the restricted areas and movements and storage within them;
- .5 use of continuously monitored and recording surveillance equipment;
- .6 enhancing the number and frequency of patrols, including water-side patrols, undertaken on the boundaries of the restricted areas and within the areas;
- .7 establishing and restricting access to areas adjacent to the restricted areas; and
- .8 enforcing restrictions on access by unauthorized craft to the waters adjacent to ships using the port facility.

### *Security level 3*

**16.29** At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the port facility in close co-operation with those responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

- .1 setting up of additional restricted areas within the port facility in proximity to the security incident, or the believed location of the security threat, to which access is denied; and
- .2 preparing for the searching of restricted areas as part of a search of all, or part, of the port facility.

### *Handling of cargo*

**16.30** The security measures relating to cargo handling should:

- .1 prevent tampering; and
- .2 prevent cargo that is not meant for carriage from being accepted and stored within the port facility.

**16.31** The security measures should include inventory control procedures at access points to the port facility. Once within the port facility, cargo should be capable of being identified as having been checked and accepted for loading onto a ship or for temporary storage in a restricted area while awaiting loading. It may be appropriate to restrict the entry of cargo to the port facility that does not have a confirmed date for loading.



*Security level 1*

**16.32** At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied during cargo handling, which may include:

- .1 routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo storage areas within the port facility prior to, and during, cargo handling operations;
- .2 checks to ensure that cargo entering the port facility matches the delivery note or equivalent cargo documentation;
- .3 searches of vehicles; and
- .4 checking of seals and other methods used to prevent tampering upon entering the port facility and upon storage within the port facility.

**16.33** Checking of cargo may be accomplished by some or all of the following means:

- .1 visual and physical examination; and
- .2 using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs.

**16.34** When there are regular or repeated cargo movements, the CSO or the SSO may, in consultation with the port facility, agree arrangements with shippers or others responsible for such cargo covering off-site checking, sealing, scheduling, supporting documentation, etc. Such arrangements should be communicated to and agreed with the PFSP concerned.

*Security level 2*

**16.35** At security level 2, the PFSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied during cargo handling to enhance control, which may include:

- .1 detailed checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo storage areas within the port facility;
- .2 intensified checks, as appropriate, to ensure that only the documented cargo enters the port facility, is temporarily stored there and is then loaded onto the ship;
- .3 intensified searches of vehicles; and
- .4 increased frequency and detail in checking of seals and other methods used to prevent tampering.

**16.36** Detailed checking of cargo may be accomplished by some or all of the following means:

- .1 increasing the frequency and detail of checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo storage areas within the port facility (visual and physical examination);

- .2 increasing the frequency of the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs; and
- .3 co-ordinating enhanced security measures with the shipper or other responsible party in addition to an established agreement and procedures.

*Security level 3*

**16.37** At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the port facility in close co-operation with those responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

- .1 restriction or suspension of cargo movements or operations within all, or part, of the port facility or specific ships; and
- .2 verifying the inventory of dangerous goods and hazardous substances held within the port facility and their location.

*Delivery of ship's stores*

**16.38** The security measures relating to the delivery of ship's stores should:

- .1 ensure checking of ship's stores and package integrity;
- .2 prevent ship's stores from being accepted without inspection;
- .3 prevent tampering;
- .4 prevent ship's stores from being accepted unless ordered;
- .5 ensure searching the delivery vehicle; and
- .6 ensure escorting delivery vehicles within the port facility.

**16.39** For ships regularly using the port facility it may be appropriate to establish procedures involving the ship, its suppliers and the port facility covering notification and timing of deliveries and their documentation. There should always be some way of confirming that stores presented for delivery are accompanied by evidence that they have been ordered by the ship.

*Security level 1*

**16.40** At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied to control the delivery of ship's stores, which may include:

- .1 checking of ship's stores;
- .2 advance notification as to composition of load, driver details and vehicle registration; and
- .3 searching the delivery vehicle.

**16.41** Checking of ship's stores may be accomplished by some or all of the following means:

- .1 visual and physical examination; and
- .2 using scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices or dogs.

*Security level 2*

**16.42** At security level 2, the PFSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied to enhance the control of the delivery of ship's stores, which may include:

- .1 detailed checking of ship's stores;
- .2 detailed searches of the delivery vehicles;
- .3 co-ordination with ship personnel to check the order against the delivery note prior to entry to the port facility; and
- .4 escorting the delivery vehicle within the port facility.

**16.43** Detailed checking of ship's stores may be accomplished by some or all of the following means:

- .1 increasing the frequency and detail of searches of delivery vehicles;
- .2 increasing the use of scanning/detection equipment, mechanical devices, or dogs; and
- .3 restricting, or prohibiting, entry of stores that will not leave the port facility within a specified period.

*Security level 3*

**16.44** At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the port facility, in close co-operation with those responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include preparation for restriction, or suspension, of the delivery of ship's stores within all, or part, of the port facility.

*Handling unaccompanied baggage*

**16.45** The PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied to ensure that unaccompanied baggage (i.e. any baggage, including personal effects, which is not with the passenger or member of ship's personnel at the point of inspection or search) is identified and subjected to appropriate screening, including searching, before is allowed in the port facility and, depending on the storage arrangements, before it is transferred between the port facility and the ship. It is not envisaged that such baggage will be

subjected to screening by both the port facility and the ship, and in cases where both are suitably equipped, the responsibility for screening should rest with the port facility. Close co-operation with the ship is essential and steps should be taken to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is handled securely after screening.

*Security level 1*

**16.46** At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage to ensure that unaccompanied baggage is screened or searched up to and including 100%, which may include use of x-ray screening.

*Security level 2*

**16.47** At security level 2, the PFSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied when handling unaccompanied baggage which should include 100% x-ray screening of all unaccompanied baggage.

*Security level 3*

**16.48** At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the port facility in close co-operation with those responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

- .1 subjecting such baggage to more extensive screening, for example x-raying it from at least two different angles;
- .2 preparations for restriction or suspension of handling of unaccompanied baggage; and
- .3 refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage into the port facility.

*Monitoring the security of the port facility*

**16.49** The port facility security organization should have the capability to monitor the port facility and its nearby approaches, on land and water, at all times, including the night hours and periods of limited visibility, the restricted areas within the port facility, the ships at the port facility and areas surrounding ships. Such monitoring can include use of:

- .1 lighting;
- .2 security guards, including foot, vehicle and waterborne patrols; and
- .3 automatic intrusion-detection devices and surveillance equipment.

**16.50** When used, automatic intrusion-detection devices should activate an audible and/or visual alarm at a location that is continuously attended or monitored.

**16.51** The PFSP should establish the procedures and equipment needed at each security level and the means of ensuring that monitoring equipment will be able to perform continually, including consideration of the possible effects of weather or of power disruptions.

*Security level 1*

**16.52** At security level 1, the PFSP should establish the security measures to be applied, which may be a combination of lighting, security guards or use of security and surveillance equipment to allow port facility security personnel to:

- .1 observe the general port facility area, including shore- and water-side accesses to it;
- .2 observe access points, barriers and restricted areas; and
- .3 allow port facility security personnel to monitor areas and movements adjacent to ships using the port facility, including augmentation of lighting provided by the ship itself.

*Security level 2*

**16.53** At security level 2, the PFSP should establish the additional security measures to be applied, to enhance the monitoring and surveillance capability, which may include:

- .1 increasing the coverage and intensity of lighting and surveillance equipment, including the provision of additional lighting and surveillance coverage;
- .2 increasing the frequency of foot, vehicle or waterborne patrols; and
- .3 assigning additional security personnel to monitor and patrol.

*Security level 3*

**16.54** At security level 3, the port facility should comply with the instructions issued by those responding to the security incident or threat thereof. The PFSP should detail the security measures which could be taken by the port facility in close co-operation with those responding and the ships at the port facility, which may include:

- .1 switching on all lighting within, or illuminating the vicinity of, the port facility;
- .2 switching on all surveillance equipment capable of recording activities within, or adjacent to, the port facility; and

- .3 maximizing the length of time such surveillance equipment can continue to record.

*Differing security levels*

**16.55** The PFSP should establish details of the procedures and security measures the port facility could adopt if the port facility is at a lower security level than that applying to a ship.

*Activities not covered by the Code*

**16.56** The PFSP should establish details of the procedures and security measures the port facility should apply when:

- .1 it is interfacing with a ship which has been at a port of a State which is not a Contracting Government;
- .2 it is interfacing with a ship to which this Code does not apply; and
- .3 it is interfacing with fixed or floating platforms or mobile offshore drilling units on location.

*Declarations of Security*

**16.57** The PFSP should establish the procedures to be followed when, on the instructions of the Contracting Government, the PFSO requests a DoS or when a DoS is requested by a ship.

*Audit, review and amendment*

**16.58** The PFSP should establish how the PFSO intends to audit the continued effectiveness of the PFSP and the procedure to be followed to review, update or amend the PFSP.

**16.59** The PFSP should be reviewed at the discretion of the PFSO. In addition it should be reviewed:

- .1 if the PFSA relating to the port facility is altered;
- .2 if an independent audit of the PFSP or the Contracting Government's testing of the port facility security organization identifies failings in the organization or questions the continuing relevance of significant elements of the approved PFSP;
- .3 following security incidents or threats thereof involving the port facility; and
- .4 following changes in ownership or operational control of the port facility.

**16.60** The PFSP can recommend appropriate amendments to the approved plan following any review of the plan. Amendments to the PFSP relating to:

- .1 proposed changes which could fundamentally alter the approach adopted to maintaining the security of the port facility; and
- .2 the removal, alteration or replacement of permanent barriers, security and surveillance equipment and systems, etc., previously considered essential in maintaining the security of the port facility

should be submitted to the Contracting Government that approved the original PFSP for their consideration and approval. Such approval can be given by, or on behalf of, the Contracting Government with, or without, amendments to the proposed changes. On approval of the PFSP, the Contracting Government should indicate which procedural or physical alterations have to be submitted to it for approval.

#### *Approval of port facility security plans*

**16.61** PFSPs have to be approved by the relevant Contracting Government, which should establish appropriate procedures to provide for:

- .1 the submission of PFSPs to them;
- .2 the consideration of PFSPs;
- .3 the approval of PFSPs, with or without amendments;
- .4 consideration of amendments submitted after approval; and
- .5 procedures for inspecting or auditing the continuing relevance of the approved PFSP.

At all stages, steps should be taken to ensure that the contents of the PFSP remain confidential.

#### *Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility*

**16.62** The Contracting Government within whose territory a port facility is located may issue an appropriate Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility (SoCPF) indicating:

- .1 the port facility;
- .2 that the port facility complies with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of the Code;
- .3 the period of validity of the SoCPF, which should be specified by the Contracting Governments but should not exceed five years; and

- .4 the subsequent verification arrangements established by the Contracting Government and a confirmation when these are carried out.

**16.63** The Statement of Compliance of a Port Facility should be in the form set out in the appendix to this Part of the Code. If the language used is not Spanish, French or English, the Contracting Government, if it considers it appropriate, may also include a translation into one of these languages.

## **17 Port facility security officer**

### *General*

**17.1** In those exceptional instances where the ship security officer has questions about the validity of identification documents of those seeking to board the ship for official purposes, the port facility security officer should assist.

**17.2** The port facility security officer should not be responsible for routine confirmation of the identity of those seeking to board the ship.

*In addition, other relevant guidance is provided under sections 15, 16 and 18.*

## **18 Training, drills and exercises on port facility security**

### *Training*

**18.1** The port facility security officer should have knowledge and receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate:

- .1 security administration;
- .2 relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations;
- .3 relevant Government legislation and regulations;
- .4 responsibilities and functions of other security organizations;
- .5 methodology of port facility security assessment;
- .6 methods of ship and port facility security surveys and inspections;
- .7 ship and port operations and conditions;
- .8 ship and port facility security measures;
- .9 emergency preparedness and response and contingency planning;
- .10 instruction techniques for security training and education, including security measures and procedures;
- .11 handling sensitive security-related information and security-related communications;



- .12 knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- .13 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- .14 recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten the security;
- .15 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
- .16 security equipment and systems, and their operational limitations;
- .17 methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring;
- .18 methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections;
- .19 security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with ships; and
- .20 assessment of security drills and exercises.

**18.2** Port facility personnel having specific security duties should have knowledge and receive training in some or all of the following, as appropriate:

- .1 knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
- .2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- .3 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
- .4 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
- .5 crowd management and control techniques;
- .6 security-related communications;
- .7 operations of security equipment and systems;
- .8 testing, calibration and maintenance of security equipment and systems;
- .9 inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and
- .10 methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and ship's stores.

**18.3** All other port facility personnel should have knowledge of and be familiar with relevant provisions of the PFSP in some or all of the following, as appropriate:

- .1 the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels;

- .2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
- .3 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten the security; and
- .4 techniques used to circumvent security measures.

*Drills and exercises*

**18.4** The objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that port facility personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties, at all security levels, and to identify any security-related deficiencies which need to be addressed.

**18.5** To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the port facility security plan, drills should be conducted at least every three months unless the specific circumstances dictate otherwise. These drills should test individual elements of the plan such as those security threats listed in paragraph 15.11.

**18.6** Various types of exercises, which may include participation of port facility security officers, in conjunction with relevant authorities of Contracting Governments, company security officers, or ship security officers, if available, should be carried out at least once each calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. Requests for the participation of company security officers or ship security officers in joint exercises should be made, bearing in mind the security and work implications for the ship. These exercises should test communication, co-ordination, resource availability and response. These exercises may be:

- .1 full-scale or live;
- .2 tabletop simulation or seminar; or
- .3 combined with other exercises held, such as emergency response or other port State authority exercises.

**19 Verification and certification for ships**

*No additional guidance.*

Appendix to part B

Appendix 1

**Form of a Declaration of Security  
between a ship and a port facility\***

**DECLARATION OF SECURITY**

Name of ship:	<input type="text"/>
Port of registry:	<input type="text"/>
IMO Number:	<input type="text"/>
Name of port facility:	<input type="text"/>

This Declaration of Security is valid from ..... until .....  
for the following activities:

.....  
*(list the activities with relevant details)*

under the following security levels

Security level(s) for the ship:	<input type="text"/>
Security level(s) for the port facility:	<input type="text"/>

The port facility and ship agree to the following security measures and responsibilities to ensure compliance with the requirements of part A of the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities.

\* This form of Declaration of Security is for use between a ship and a port facility. If the Declaration of Security is to cover two ships, this model should be appropriately modified.

Activity	The port facility:	The ship:
Ensuring the performance of all security duties		
Monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized personnel have access		
Controlling access to the port facility		
Controlling access to the ship		
Monitoring of the port facility, including berthing areas and areas surrounding the ship		
Monitoring of the ship, including berthing areas and areas surrounding the ship		
Handling of cargo		
Delivery of ship's stores		
Handling unaccompanied baggage		
Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects		
Ensuring that security communication is readily available between the ship and the port facility		

The affixing of the initials of the SSO or PFSO under these columns indicates that the activity will be done, in accordance with the relevant approved plan, by

The signatories to this agreement certify that security measures and arrangements for both the port facility and the ship during the specified activities meet the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of the Code that will be implemented in accordance with the provisions already stipulated in their approved plan or the specific arrangements agreed to and set out in the attached annex.

Dated at ..... on the .....

Signed for and on behalf of	
the port facility:	the ship:

*(Signature of  
port facility security officer)*

*(Signature of master or  
ship security officer)*

Name and title of person who signed	
Name:	Name:
Title:	Title:

Contact details <i>(to be completed as appropriate)</i> <i>(indicate the telephone numbers or the radio channels or frequencies to be used)</i>	
for the port facility:	for the ship:

Port facility

Master

Port facility security officer

Ship security officer

Company

Company security officer

Appendix 2

**Form of a Statement of Compliance  
of a Port Facility**

**STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE OF A PORT FACILITY**

*(Official seal)*

*(State)*

Statement Number.....

Issued under the provisions of part B of the  
INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE SECURITY OF SHIPS AND OF PORT FACILITIES  
(ISPS CODE)

The Government of

.....  
*(name of the State)*

Name of the port facility.....

Address of the port facility.....

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the compliance of this port facility with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and part A of the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (ISPS Code) has been verified and that this port facility operates in accordance with the approved port facility security plan. This plan has been approved for the following <specify the types of operations, types of ship or activities or other relevant information> (delete as appropriate):

- Passenger ship
- Passenger high-speed craft
- Cargo high-speed craft
- Bulk carrier
- Oil tanker
- Chemical tanker
- Gas carrier
- Mobile offshore drilling units
- Cargo ships other than those referred to above

This Statement of Compliance is valid until ..... , subject  
to verifications (as indicated overleaf)

Issued at .....  
*(place of issue of the statement)*

Date of issue .....  
*(Signature of the duly authorized official  
issuing the document)*

*(Seal or stamp of the issuing authority, as appropriate)*

**Endorsement for verifications**

The Government of <insert name of the State> has established that the validity of this Statement of Compliance is subject to <insert relevant details of the verifications (e.g. mandatory annual or unscheduled)>.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that, during a verification carried out in accordance with paragraph B/16.62.4 of the ISPS Code, the port facility was found to comply with the relevant provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and Part A of the ISPS Code.

1st VERIFICATION

Signed: .....  
(Signature of authorized official)

Place: .....

Date: .....

2nd VERIFICATION

Signed: .....  
(Signature of authorized official)

Place: .....

Date: .....

3rd VERIFICATION

Signed: .....  
(Signature of authorized official)

Place: .....

Date: .....

4th VERIFICATION

Signed: .....  
(Signature of authorized official)

Place: .....

Date: .....



Conference resolution 1  
(adopted on 12 December 2002)

**Adoption of amendments to the Annex to the  
International Convention for the  
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974**

THE CONFERENCE,

BEARING IN MIND the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States,

DEEPLY CONCERNED about the world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms, which endanger or take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms and seriously impair the dignity of human beings,

BEING AWARE of the importance and significance of shipping to the world trade and economy and, therefore, being determined to safeguard the world-wide supply chain against any breach resulting from terrorist attacks against ships, ports, offshore terminals or other facilities,

CONSIDERING that unlawful acts against shipping jeopardize the safety and security of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of maritime services and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of maritime navigation,

CONSIDERING that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole, while also recognizing the importance of the efficient and economic movement of world trade,

BEING CONVINCED of the urgent need to develop international co-operation between States in devising and adopting effective and practical measures, additional to those already adopted by the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Organization"), to prevent and suppress unlawful acts directed against shipping in its broad sense,

RECALLING the United Nations Security Council resolution 1373(2001), adopted on 28 September 2001, requiring States to take measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including calling on States to implement fully anti-terrorist conventions,

HAVING NOTED the Co-operative G8 Action on Transport Security (in particular, the Maritime Security section thereof), endorsed by the G8 Leaders during their Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta (Canada) in June 2002,

RECALLING article VIII(c) of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), concerning the procedure for amending the Convention by a Conference of Contracting Governments,

NOTING resolution A.924(22) entitled “Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crew and the safety of ship”, adopted by the Assembly of the Organization on 20 November 2001, which, *inter alia*:

- (a) recognizes the need for the Organization to review, with the intent to revise, existing international legal and technical measures, and to consider appropriate new measures, to prevent and suppress terrorism against ships and to improve security aboard and ashore in order to reduce the risk to passengers, crew and port personnel on board ships and in port areas and to the vessels and their cargoes; and
- (b) requests the Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee, the Legal Committee and the Facilitation Committee under the direction of the Council to undertake, on a high-priority basis, a review to ascertain whether there is a need to update the instruments referred to in the preambular paragraphs of the aforesaid resolution and any other relevant IMO instrument under their scope and/or to adopt other security measures and, in the light of such a review, to take action as appropriate,

HAVING IDENTIFIED resolution A.584(14) entitled “Measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crew”, MSC/Circ.443 on “Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crew on board ships” and MSC/Circ.754 on “Passenger ferry security” among the IMO instruments relevant to the scope of resolution A.924(22),

RECALLING resolution 5 entitled “Future amendments to chapter XI of the 1974 SOLAS Convention on special measures to enhance maritime safety”, adopted by the 1994 Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974,

HAVING CONSIDERED amendments to the Annex of the Convention proposed and circulated to all Members of the Organization and to all Contracting Governments to the Convention,

1. ADOPTS, in accordance with article VIII(c)(ii) of the Convention, amendments to the Annex of the Convention, the text of which is given in the Annex to the present resolution;
2. DETERMINES, in accordance with article VIII(b)(vi)(2)(bb) of the Convention, that the aforementioned amendments shall be deemed to have been accepted on 1 January 2004, unless, prior to that date, more than one

third of the Contracting Governments to the Convention or Contracting Governments the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet have notified their objections to the amendments;

3. INVITES Contracting Governments to the Convention to note that, in accordance with article VIII(b)(vii)(2) of the Convention, the said amendments shall enter into force on 1 July 2004 upon their acceptance in accordance with paragraph 2 above;

4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization, in conformity with article VIII(b)(v) of the Convention, to transmit certified copies of the present resolution and the text of the amendments contained in the annex to all Contracting Governments to the Convention;

5. FURTHER REQUESTS the Secretary-General to transmit copies of this resolution and its Annex to all Members of the Organization which are not Contracting Governments to the Convention.

## Annex

# Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended

## CHAPTER V

### *Safety of navigation*

#### **Regulation 19**

#### *Carriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment*

1 *The existing subparagraphs .4, .5 and .6 of paragraph 2.4.2 are replaced by the following:*

“4 in the case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage, not later than the first safety equipment survey\* after 1 July 2004 or by 31 December 2004, whichever occurs earlier; and”

2 *The following new sentence is added at the end of the existing subparagraph .7 of paragraph 2.4:*

“Ships fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.”

## CHAPTER XI

### *Special measures to enhance maritime safety*

3 *The existing chapter XI is renumbered as chapter XI-1.*

---

\* *The first safety equipment survey* means the first annual survey, the first periodical survey or the first renewal survey for safety equipment, whichever is due first after 1 July 2004, and, in addition, in the case of ships under construction, the initial survey.

## Annex

# Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended

## CHAPTER V

### *Safety of navigation*

#### **Regulation 19**

#### *Carriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment*

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“Ships fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.”

## CHAPTER XI

### *Special measures to enhance maritime safety*

3 *The existing chapter XI is renumbered as chapter XI-1.*

---

\* *The first safety equipment survey means the first annual survey, the first periodical survey or the first renewal survey for safety equipment, whichever is due first after 1 July 2004, and, in addition, in the case of ships under construction, the initial survey.*

6 The following new regulation 5 is added after the existing regulation 4:

## **“Regulation 5**

### *Continuous Synopsis Record*

**1** Every ship to which chapter I applies shall be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record.

**2.1** The Continuous Synopsis Record is intended to provide an on-board record of the history of the ship with respect to the information recorded therein.

**2.2** For ships constructed before 1 July 2004, the Continuous Synopsis Record shall, at least, provide the history of the ship as from 1 July 2004.

**3** The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be issued by the Administration to each ship that is entitled to fly its flag and it shall contain, at least, the following information:

- .1** the name of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly;
- .2** the date on which the ship was registered with that State;
- .3** the ship's identification number in accordance with regulation 3;
- .4** the name of the ship;
- .5** the port at which the ship is registered;
- .6** the name of the registered owner(s) and their registered address(es);
- .7** the name of the registered bareboat charterer(s) and their registered address(es), if applicable;
- .8** the name of the Company, as defined in regulation IX/1, its registered address and the address(es) from where it carries out the safety-management activities;
- .9** the name of all classification society(ies) with which the ship is classed;
- .10** the name of the Administration or of the Contracting Government or of the recognized organization which has issued the Document of Compliance (or the Interim Document of Compliance), specified in the ISM Code as defined in regulation IX/1, to the Company operating the ship and the name of the body which has carried out the audit on the basis of which the Document was issued, if other than that issuing the Document;
- .11** the name of the Administration or of the Contracting Government or of the recognized organization that has issued the Safety Management Certificate (or the Interim Safety

Management Certificate), specified in the ISM Code as defined in regulation IX/1, to the ship and the name of the body which has carried out the audit on the basis of which the Certificate was issued, if other than that issuing the Certificate;

- .12** the name of the Administration or of the Contracting Government or of the recognized security organization that has issued the International Ship Security Certificate (or the Interim International Ship Security Certificate), specified in part A of the ISPS Code as defined in regulation XI-2/1, to the ship and the name of the body which has carried out the verification on the basis of which the Certificate was issued, if other than that issuing the Certificate; and
- .13** the date on which the ship ceased to be registered with that State.

**4.1** Any changes relating to the entries referred to in paragraphs 3.4 to 3.12 shall be recorded in the Continuous Synopsis Record so as to provide updated and current information together with the history of the changes.

**4.2** In case of any changes relating to the entries referred to in paragraph 4.1, the Administration shall issue, as soon as is practically possible but not later than three months from the date of the change, to the ships entitled to fly its flag either a revised and updated version of the Continuous Synopsis Record or appropriate amendments thereto.

**4.3** In case of any changes relating to the entries referred to in paragraph 4.1, the Administration, pending the issue of a revised and updated version of the Continuous Synopsis Record, shall authorize and require either the Company as defined in regulation IX/1 or the master of the ship to amend the Continuous Synopsis Record to reflect the changes. In such cases, after the Continuous Synopsis Record has been amended, the Company shall, without delay, inform the Administration accordingly.

**5.1** The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be in English, French or Spanish language. Additionally, a translation of the Continuous Synopsis Record into the official language or languages of the Administration may be provided.

**5.2** The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be in the format developed by the Organization and shall be maintained in accordance with guidelines developed by the Organization. Any previous entries in the Continuous Synopsis Record shall not be modified, deleted or, in any way, erased or defaced.

**6** Whenever a ship is transferred to the flag of another State or the ship is sold to another owner (or is taken over by another bareboat charterer) or another Company assumes the responsibility for the operation of the ship, the Continuous Synopsis Record shall be left on board.

**7** When a ship is to be transferred to the flag of another State, the Company shall notify the Administration of the name of the State under whose flag the ship is to be transferred so as to enable the Administration to forward to that State a copy of the Continuous Synopsis Record covering the period during which the ship was under its jurisdiction.

**8** When a ship is transferred to the flag of another State the Government of which is a Contracting Government, the Contracting Government of the State whose flag the ship was flying hitherto shall transmit to the Administration, as soon as possible after the transfer takes place, a copy of the relevant Continuous Synopsis Record covering the period during which the ship was under their jurisdiction together with any Continuous Synopsis Records previously issued to the ship by other States.

**9** When a ship is transferred to the flag of another State, the Administration shall append the previous Continuous Synopsis Records to the Continuous Synopsis Record the Administration will issue to the ship so to provide the continuous history record intended by this regulation.

**10** The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be kept on board the ship and shall be available for inspection at all times.”

*7 The following new chapter XI-2 is inserted after the renumbered chapter XI-1:*

## **“CHAPTER XI-2 Special measures to enhance maritime security**

### **Regulation 1**

#### *Definitions*

- 1** For the purpose of this chapter, unless expressly provided otherwise:
- .1** *Bulk carrier* means a bulk carrier as defined in regulation IX/1.6.
  - .2** *Chemical tanker* means a chemical tanker as defined in regulation VII/8.2.
  - .3** *Gas carrier* means a gas carrier as defined in regulation VII/11.2.
  - .4** *High-speed craft* means a craft as defined in regulation X/1.2.
  - .5** *Mobile offshore drilling unit* means a mechanically propelled mobile offshore drilling unit, as defined in regulation IX/1, not on location.
  - .6** *Oil tanker* means an oil tanker as defined in regulation II-1/2.12.
  - .7** *Company* means a Company as defined in regulation IX/1.



- .8 *Ship/port interface* means the interactions that occur when a ship is directly and immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or the provisions of port services to or from the ship.
- .9 *Port facility* is a location, as determined by the Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority, where the ship/port interface takes place. This includes areas such as anchorages, waiting berths and approaches from seaward, as appropriate.
- .10 *Ship-to-ship activity* means any activity not related to a port facility that involves the transfer of goods or persons from one ship to another.
- .11 *Designated Authority* means the organization(s) or the administration(s) identified, within the Contracting Government, as responsible for ensuring the implementation of the provisions of this chapter pertaining to port facility security and ship/port interface, from the point of view of the port facility.
- .12 *International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code* means the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities consisting of part A (the provisions of which shall be treated as mandatory) and part B (the provisions of which shall be treated as recommendatory), as adopted, on 12 December 2002, by resolution 2 of the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as may be amended by the Organization, provided that:
  - .1 amendments to part A of the Code are adopted, brought into force and take effect in accordance with article VIII of the present Convention concerning the amendment procedures applicable to the Annex other than chapter I; and
  - .2 amendments to part B of the Code are adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee in accordance with its Rules of Procedure.
- .13 *Security incident* means any suspicious act or circumstance threatening the security of a ship, including a mobile offshore drilling unit and a high-speed craft, or of a port facility or of any ship/port interface or any ship-to-ship activity.
- .14 *Security level* means the qualification of the degree of risk that a security incident will be attempted or will occur.
- .15 *Declaration of Security* means an agreement reached between a ship and either a port facility or another ship with which it interfaces, specifying the security measures each will implement.

**.16** *Recognized security organization* means an organization with appropriate expertise in security matters and with appropriate knowledge of ship and port operations authorized to carry out an assessment, or a verification, or an approval or a certification activity, required by this chapter or by part A of the ISPS Code.

**2** The term “ship”, when used in regulations 3 to 13, includes mobile offshore drilling units and high-speed craft.

**3** The term “all ships”, when used in this chapter, means any ship to which this chapter applies.

**4** The term “Contracting Government”, when used in regulations 3, 4, 7 and 10 to 13, includes a reference to the Designated Authority.

## Regulation 2

### *Application*

**1** This chapter applies to:

**.1** the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:

**.1.1** passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;

**.1.2** cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards; and

**.1.3** mobile offshore drilling units; and

**.2** port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.

**2** Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1.2, Contracting Governments shall decide the extent of application of this chapter and of the relevant sections of part A of the ISPS Code to those port facilities within their territory which, although used primarily by ships not engaged on international voyages, are required, occasionally, to serve ships arriving or departing on an international voyage.

**2.1** Contracting Governments shall base their decisions, under paragraph 2, on a port facility security assessment carried out in accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code.

**2.2** Any decision which a Contracting Government makes, under paragraph 2, shall not compromise the level of security intended to be achieved by this chapter or by part A of the ISPS Code.

**3** This chapter does not apply to warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships owned or operated by a Contracting Government and used only on Government non-commercial service.

**4** Nothing in this chapter shall prejudice the rights or obligations of States under international law.

### **Regulation 3**

#### *Obligations of Contracting Governments with respect to security*

**1** Administrations shall set security levels and ensure the provision of security level information to ships entitled to fly their flag. When changes in security level occur, security-level information shall be updated as the circumstance dictates.

**2** Contracting Governments shall set security levels and ensure the provision of security-level information to port facilities within their territory, and to ships prior to entering a port or whilst in a port within their territory. When changes in security level occur, security-level information shall be updated as the circumstance dictates.

### **Regulation 4**

#### *Requirements for Companies and ships*

**1** Companies shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and of part A of the ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

**2** Ships shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and of part A of the ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code, and such compliance shall be verified and certified as provided for in part A of the ISPS Code.

**3** Prior to entering a port or whilst in a port within the territory of a Contracting Government, a ship shall comply with the requirements for the security level set by that Contracting Government, if such security level is higher than the security level set by the Administration for that ship.

**4** Ships shall respond without undue delay to any change to a higher security level.

**5** Where a ship is not in compliance with the requirements of this chapter or of part A of the ISPS Code, or cannot comply with the requirements of the security level set by the Administration or by another Contracting Government and applicable to that ship, then the ship shall notify the appropriate competent authority prior to conducting any ship/port interface or prior to entry into port, whichever occurs earlier.

## Regulation 5

### *Specific responsibility of Companies*

The Company shall ensure that the master has available on board, at all times, information through which officers duly authorized by a Contracting Government can establish:

- .1 who is responsible for appointing the members of the crew or other persons currently employed or engaged on board the ship in any capacity on the business of that ship;
- .2 who is responsible for deciding the employment of the ship; and
- .3 in cases where the ship is employed under the terms of charter party(ies), who are the parties to such charter party(ies).

## Regulation 6

### *Ship security alert system\**

- 1 All ships shall be provided with a ship security alert system, as follows:
  - .1 ships constructed on or after 1 July 2004;
  - .2 passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft, constructed before 1 July 2004, not later than the first survey of the radio installation after 1 July 2004;
  - .3 oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards constructed before 1 July 2004, not later than the first survey of the radio installation after 1 July 2004; and
  - .4 other cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upward and mobile offshore drilling units constructed before 1 July 2004, not later than the first survey of the radio installation after 1 July 2006.
- 2 The ship security alert system, when activated, shall:
  - .1 initiate and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the Administration, which in these circumstances may include the Company, identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised;
  - .2 not send the ship security alert to any other ships;
  - .3 not raise any alarm on board the ship; and
  - .4 continue the ship security alert until deactivated and/or reset.

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\* Refer to the performance standards for a ship security alert system adopted by resolution MSC.136(76).

- 3** The ship security alert system shall:
- .1** be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one other location; and
  - .2** conform to performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the Organization.
- 4** The ship security alert system activation points shall be designed so as to prevent the inadvertent initiation of the ship security alert.
- 5** The requirement for a ship security alert system may be complied with by using the radio installation fitted for compliance with the requirements of chapter IV, provided all requirements of this regulation are complied with.
- 6** When an Administration receives notification of a ship security alert, that Administration shall immediately notify the State(s) in the vicinity of which the ship is presently operating.
- 7** When a Contracting Government receives notification of a ship security alert from a ship which is not entitled to fly its flag, that Contracting Government shall immediately notify the relevant Administration and, if appropriate, the State(s) in the vicinity of which the ship is presently operating.

## **Regulation 7**

### *Threats to ships*

- 1** Contracting Governments shall set security levels and ensure the provision of security-level information to ships operating in their territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea.
- 2** Contracting Governments shall provide a point of contact through which such ships can request advice or assistance and to which such ships can report any security concerns about other ships, movements or communications.
- 3** Where a risk of attack has been identified, the Contracting Government concerned shall advise the ships concerned and their Administrations of:
- .1** the current security level;
  - .2** any security measures that should be put in place by the ships concerned to protect themselves from attack, in accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code; and
  - .3** security measures that the coastal State has decided to put in place, as appropriate.

## **Regulation 8**

### *Master's discretion for ship safety and security*

**1** The master shall not be constrained by the Company, the charterer or any other person from taking or executing any decision which, in the professional judgement of the master, is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship. This includes denial of access to persons (except those identified as duly authorized by a Contracting Government) or their effects and refusal to load cargo, including containers or other closed cargo transport units.

**2** If, in the professional judgement of the master, a conflict between any safety and security requirements applicable to the ship arises during its operations, the master shall give effect to those requirements necessary to maintain the safety of the ship. In such cases, the master may implement temporary security measures and shall forthwith inform the Administration and, if appropriate, the Contracting Government in whose port the ship is operating or intends to enter. Any such temporary security measures under this regulation shall, to the highest possible degree, be commensurate with the prevailing security level. When such cases are identified, the Administration shall ensure that such conflicts are resolved and that the possibility of recurrence is minimized.

## **Regulation 9**

### *Control and compliance measures*

#### **1 Control of ships in port**

**1.1** For the purpose of this chapter, every ship to which this chapter applies is subject to control when in a port of another Contracting Government by officers duly authorized by that Government, who may be the same as those carrying out the functions of regulation I/19. Such control shall be limited to verifying that there is on board a valid International Ship Security Certificate or a valid Interim International Ship Security Certificate issued under the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code ("Certificate"), which if valid shall be accepted, unless there are clear grounds for believing that the ship is not in compliance with the requirements of this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code.

**1.2** When there are such clear grounds, or when no valid Certificate is produced when required, the officers duly authorized by the Contracting Government shall impose any one or more control measures in relation to that ship as provided in paragraph 1.3. Any such measures imposed must be proportionate, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

**1.3** Such control measures are as follows: inspection of the ship, delaying the ship, detention of the ship, restriction of operations, including movement within the port, or expulsion of the ship from port. Such control measures may additionally or alternatively include other lesser administrative or corrective measures.

## **2 Ships intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government**

**2.1** For the purpose of this chapter, a Contracting Government may require that ships intending to enter its ports provide the following information to officers duly authorized by that Government to ensure compliance with this chapter prior to entry into port with the aim of avoiding the need to impose control measures or steps:

- .1** that the ship possesses a valid Certificate and the name of its issuing authority;
- .2** the security level at which the ship is currently operating;
- .3** the security level at which the ship operated in any previous port where it has conducted a ship/port interface within the timeframe specified in paragraph 2.3;
- .4** any special or additional security measures that were taken by the ship in any previous port where it has conducted a ship/port interface within the timeframe specified in paragraph 2.3;
- .5** that the appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during any ship-to-ship activity within the timeframe specified in paragraph 2.3; or
- .6** other practical security-related information (but not details of the ship security plan), taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

If requested by the Contracting Government, the ship or the Company shall provide confirmation, acceptable to that Contracting Government, of the information required above.

**2.2** Every ship to which this chapter applies intending to enter the port of another Contracting Government shall provide the information described in paragraph 2.1 on the request of the officers duly authorized by that Government. The master may decline to provide such information on the understanding that failure to do so may result in denial of entry into port.

**2.3** The ship shall keep records of the information referred to in paragraph 2.1 for the last 10 calls at port facilities.

**2.4** If, after receipt of the information described in paragraph 2.1, officers duly authorized by the Contracting Government of the port in which the ship intends to enter have clear grounds for believing that the ship is in non-

compliance with the requirements of this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code, such officers shall attempt to establish communication with and between the ship and the Administration in order to rectify the non-compliance. If such communication does not result in rectification, or if such officers have clear grounds otherwise for believing that the ship is in non-compliance with the requirements of this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code, such officers may take steps in relation to that ship as provided in paragraph 2.5. Any such steps taken must be proportionate, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

**2.5** Such steps are as follows:

- .1 a requirement for the rectification of the non-compliance;
- .2 a requirement that the ship proceed to a location specified in the territorial sea or internal waters of that Contracting Government;
- .3 inspection of the ship, if the ship is in the territorial sea of the Contracting Government the port of which the ship intends to enter; or
- .4 denial of entry into port.

Prior to initiating any such steps, the ship shall be informed by the Contracting Government of its intentions. Upon this information the master may withdraw the intention to enter that port. In such cases, this regulation shall not apply.

### **3 Additional provisions**

**3.1** In the event:

- .1 of the imposition of a control measure, other than a lesser administrative or corrective measure, referred to in paragraph 1.3; or
- .2 any of the steps referred to in paragraph 2.5 are taken,

an officer duly authorized by the Contracting Government shall forthwith inform in writing the Administration specifying which control measures have been imposed or steps taken and the reasons thereof. The Contracting Government imposing the control measures or steps shall also notify the recognized security organization which issued the Certificate relating to the ship concerned and the Organization when any such control measures have been imposed or steps taken.

**3.2** When entry into port is denied or the ship is expelled from port, the authorities of the port State should communicate the appropriate facts to the authorities of the State of the next appropriate ports of call, when known, and any other appropriate coastal States, taking into account guidelines to be



developed by the Organization. Confidentiality and security of such notification shall be ensured.

**3.3** Denial of entry into port, pursuant to paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5, or expulsion from port, pursuant to paragraphs 1.1 to 1.3, shall only be imposed where the officers duly authorized by the Contracting Government have clear grounds to believe that the ship poses an immediate threat to the security or safety of persons, or of ships or other property and there are no other appropriate means for removing that threat.

**3.4** The control measures referred to in paragraph 1.3 and the steps referred to in paragraph 2.5 shall only be imposed, pursuant to this regulation, until the non-compliance giving rise to the control measures or steps has been corrected to the satisfaction of the Contracting Government, taking into account actions proposed by the ship or the Administration, if any.

**3.5** When Contracting Governments exercise control under paragraph 1 or take steps under paragraph 2:

- .1** all possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being unduly detained or delayed. If a ship is thereby unduly detained, or delayed, it shall be entitled to compensation for any loss or damage suffered; and
- 2** necessary access to the ship shall not be prevented for emergency or humanitarian reasons and for security purposes.

## **Regulation 10**

### *Requirements for port facilities*

**1** Port facilities shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and part A of the ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.

**2** Contracting Governments with a port facility or port facilities within their territory, to which this regulation applies, shall ensure that:

- .1** port facility security assessments are carried out, reviewed and approved in accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code; and
- 2** port facility security plans are developed, reviewed, approved and implemented in accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPS Code.

**3** Contracting Governments shall designate and communicate the measures required to be addressed in a port facility security plan for the various security levels, including when the submission of a Declaration of Security will be required.

## **Regulation 11**

### *Alternative security agreements*

1 Contracting Governments may, when implementing this chapter and part A of the ISPS Code, conclude in writing bilateral or multilateral agreements with other Contracting Governments on alternative security arrangements covering short international voyages on fixed routes between port facilities located within their territories.

2 Any such agreement shall not compromise the level of security of other ships or of port facilities not covered by the agreement.

3 No ship covered by such an agreement shall conduct any ship-to-ship activities with any ship not covered by the agreement.

4 Such agreements shall be reviewed periodically, taking into account the experience gained as well as any changes in the particular circumstances or the assessed threats to the security of the ships, the port facilities or the routes covered by the agreement.

## **Regulation 12**

### *Equivalent security arrangements*

1 An Administration may allow a particular ship or a group of ships entitled to fly its flag to implement other security measures equivalent to those prescribed in this chapter or in part A of the ISPS Code, provided such security measures are at least as effective as those prescribed in this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code. The Administration which allows such security measures shall communicate to the Organization particulars thereof.

2 When implementing this chapter and part A of the ISPS Code, a Contracting Government may allow a particular port facility or a group of port facilities located within its territory, other than those covered by an agreement concluded under regulation 11, to implement security measures equivalent to those prescribed in this chapter or in part A of the ISPS Code, provided such security measures are at least as effective as those prescribed in this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code. The Contracting Government which allows such security measures shall communicate to the Organization particulars thereof.

## **Regulation 13**

### *Communication of information*

1 Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the Organization and shall make available for the information of Companies and ships:

- .1 the names and contact details of their national authority or authorities responsible for ship and port facility security;

- 2** the locations within their territory covered by approved port facility security plans;
- 3** the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be available at all times to receive and act upon the ship-to-shore security alerts referred to in regulation 6.2.1;
- 4** the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be available at all times to receive and act upon any communications from Contracting Governments exercising control and compliance measures referred to in regulation 9.3.1; and
- 5** the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be available at all times to provide advice or assistance to ships and to whom ships can report any security concerns referred to in regulation 7.2

and thereafter update such information as and when changes relating thereto occur. The Organization shall circulate such particulars to other Contracting Governments for the information of their officers.

**2** Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the Organization the names and contact details of any recognized security organizations authorized to act on their behalf together with details of the specific responsibility and conditions of authority delegated to such organizations. Such information shall be updated as and when changes relating thereto occur. The Organization shall circulate such particulars to other Contracting Governments for the information of their officers.

**3** Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the Organization a list showing the approved port facility security plans for the port facilities located within their territory together with the location or locations covered by each approved port facility security plan and the corresponding date of approval and thereafter shall further communicate when any of the following changes take place:

- .1** changes in the location or locations covered by an approved port facility security plan are to be introduced or have been introduced. In such cases the information to be communicated shall indicate the changes in the location or locations covered by the plan and the date as of which such changes are to be introduced or were implemented;
- .2** an approved port facility security plan, previously included in the list submitted to the Organization, is to be withdrawn or has been withdrawn. In such cases, the information to be communicated shall indicate the date on which the withdrawal will take effect or was implemented. In these cases, the communication shall be made to the Organization as soon as is practically possible; and

**.3** additions are to be made to the list of approved port facility security plans. In such cases, the information to be communicated shall indicate the location or locations covered by the plan and the date of approval.

**4** Contracting Governments shall, at five year intervals after 1 July 2004, communicate to the Organization a revised and updated list showing all the approved port facility security plans for the port facilities located within their territory together with the location or locations covered by each approved port facility security plan and the corresponding date of approval (and the date of approval of any amendments thereto) which will supersede and replace all information communicated to the Organization, pursuant to paragraph 3, during the preceding five years.

**5** Contracting Governments shall communicate to the Organization information that an agreement under regulation 11 has been concluded. The information communicated shall include:

- .1** the names of the Contracting Governments which have concluded the agreement;
- .2** the port facilities and the fixed routes covered by the agreement;
- .3** the periodicity of review of the agreement;
- .4** the date of entry into force of the agreement; and
- .5** information on any consultations which have taken place with other Contracting Governments

and thereafter shall communicate, as soon as practically possible, to the Organization information when the agreement has been amended or has ended.

**6** Any Contracting Government which allows, under the provisions of regulation 12, any equivalent security arrangements with respect to a ship entitled to fly its flag or with respect to a port facility located within its territory shall communicate to the Organization particulars thereof.

**7** The Organization shall make available the information communicated under paragraph 3 to other Contracting Governments upon request.”

**Conference resolution 3**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Further work by the  
International Maritime Organization  
pertaining to the enhancement  
of maritime security**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

RECOGNIZING the need for further work in the area of enhancement of maritime security and in order to ensure the global and uniform application and implementation of the special measures to enhance maritime security adopted by the Conference,

1. INVITES the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Organization"), bearing in mind the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (hereinafter referred to as "the ISPS Code"), to:

- (a) develop training guidance such as model courses for ship security officers, company security officers, port facility security officers and company, ship and port security personnel;
- (b) review the Organization's Assembly resolution A.787(19) as amended by resolution A.882(21) on Procedures for port State control and, if found necessary, develop appropriate amendments thereto;
- (c) consider the need and, if necessary, develop further guidance on control and compliance measures on aspects other than those already addressed in part B of the ISPS Code;
- (d) consider the need and, if necessary, develop guidelines on recognized security organizations;
- (e) review the Organization's Assembly resolution A.890(21) on Principles of safe manning and, if found necessary, develop appropriate amendments thereto;

- (f) review the aspect of security of ships to which chapter XI-2 of the Convention applies when interfacing with floating production storage units and floating storage units and take action as appropriate;
- (g) consider, in the context of security, relevant aspects of facilitation of maritime traffic such as, for example, port arrivals and departures, standardized forms of reporting and electronic data interchange and take action as appropriate;
- (h) review the Organization's Assembly resolution A.872(20) on Guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged in international maritime traffic and, if necessary, develop appropriate amendments thereto; and
- (i) consider the need and, if necessary, develop any other guidance or guidelines to ensure the global, uniform and consistent implementation of the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention or part A of the ISPS Code

and to adopt them in time before the entry into force of the amendments to the Convention adopted by the Conference or as and when the Organization considers appropriate;

2. INVITES ALSO the Organization to carry out, as a matter of urgency, an impact assessment of the proposals to implement the long-range identification and tracking of ships and, if found necessary, develop and adopt appropriate performance standards and guidelines for long-range ship identification and tracking systems.

**Conference resolution 4**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Future amendments to chapters XI-1 and XI-2  
of the 1974 SOLAS Convention on  
special measures to enhance maritime safety  
and security**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

NOTING the special nature of the measures now included in the new chapter XI-2 of the Convention aimed at enhancing maritime security,

RECOGNIZING the need for urgent and special measures to enhance maritime security and the desire of Contracting Governments to bring these measures into force as soon as possible,

NOTING ALSO that it may be necessary, due to the special nature of the issues involved, to frequently amend, in the future, the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention in order to respond, in a proactive manner, to new or emerging security risks and threats,

RECALLING Resolution 5 entitled “Future amendments to chapter XI of the 1974 SOLAS Convention on special measures to enhance maritime safety”, adopted by the 1994 Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974,

DESIRING that future amendments to chapters XI-1 and XI-2 of the Convention are adopted, brought into force and given effect in the shortest possible time,

RECOMMENDS that future amendments to the provisions of chapters XI-1 and XI-2 of the Convention should be adopted by either the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization in accordance with article VIII(b) of the Convention or by a Conference of Contracting Governments to the Convention in accordance with article VIII(c) thereof.

**Conference resolution 5**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Promotion of technical co-operation  
and assistance**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

RECALLING operative paragraph 5 of resolution A.924(22) on Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships, adopted on 20 November 2001 by the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Organization”), whereby the Secretary-General of the Organization is requested to take appropriate measures within the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme to assist Governments to assess, put in place or enhance, as the case may be, appropriate infrastructure and measures to strengthen port safety and security so as to prevent and suppress terrorist acts directed against ports and port personnel as well as ships in port areas, passengers and crew,

BEING APPRECIATIVE of the steps already taken by the Secretary-General of the Organization, in response to the request of the Assembly of the Organization, to provide assistance to States in strengthening their maritime and port security infrastructure and measures,

RECOGNIZING the need for the development of appropriate legislation and the putting in place of appropriate infrastructure for ship and port facility security and relevant training facilities in order to ensure the global and uniform application and implementation of the special measures adopted to enhance maritime security,

RECOGNIZING ALSO the importance of adequate education and training for seafarers and port facility personnel to contribute to the overall efforts to enhance maritime security,

RECOGNIZING FURTHER that, in some cases, there may be limited infrastructure, facilities and training programmes for obtaining the experience required for the purpose of preventing acts which threaten the security of ships and of port facilities, particularly in developing countries,



BELIEVING that the promotion of technical co-operation at the international level will assist those States not yet having adequate expertise or facilities for providing training and experience to assess, put in place or enhance appropriate infrastructure and, in general, implement the measures required by the adopted amendments necessary to strengthen maritime security on board ships and ashore,

EMPHASIZING, in this regard, the vital role that safe and secure shipping and port operations play in sustainable socio-economic development,

1. STRONGLY URGES Contracting Governments to the Convention and Member States of the Organization to:

- (a) provide, in co-operation with the Organization, assistance to those States which have difficulty in implementing or meeting the requirements of the adopted amendments or the ISPS Code; and
- (b) use the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme of the Organization as one of the main instruments to obtain assistance in advancing effective implementation of, and compliance with, the adopted amendments and the ISPS Code;

2. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization to make adequate provision, within the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, to strengthen further the assistance that is already being provided and to promote, in co-operation, as appropriate, with relevant international organizations, the enhancement of the Organization's capacity to address the future needs of developing countries for continued education and training and the improvement of their maritime and port security infrastructure and measures;

3. INVITES donors, international organizations and the shipping and port industry to contribute financial, human and/or in-kind resources to the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme of the Organization for its maritime and port security activities;

4. INVITES ALSO the Secretary General to give early consideration to establishing a Maritime Security Trust Fund for the purpose of providing a dedicated source of financial support for maritime security technical co-operation activities and, in particular, for providing support for national initiatives in developing countries to strengthen their maritime security infrastructure and measures.

Conference resolution 6  
(adopted on 12 December 2002)

**Early implementation of the special measures to  
enhance maritime security**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

RECOGNIZING the important contribution that the implementation of the special measures adopted will make towards the safe and secure operation of ships, for pollution prevention and for the safety and security of those on board and ashore,

RECOGNIZING ALSO that the task of implementing the requirements of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") will place a significant burden on Contracting Governments, Administrations, and recognized security organizations,

RECALLING that the Code, from 1 July 2004, requires each ship to which the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the Code apply to be provided with an appropriate ship security plan,

RECALLING ALSO that each such ship is required to be provided with an International Ship Security Certificate not later than 1 July 2004,

RECOGNIZING FURTHER that the process of verifying the compliance of a ship, to which the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the Code apply, with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and of the Code cannot be undertaken until the ship security plan has been approved and its provisions have been implemented on board,

DESIRING to ensure the smooth implementation of the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and of the Code,

BEARING IN MIND the difficulties experienced during implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code,

1. DRAWS the attention of Contracting Governments to the Convention and the industry to the fact that neither chapter XI-2 of the Convention nor the Code provide for any extension of the implementation

dates for the introduction of the special measures concerned to enhance maritime security;

2. **URGES** Contracting Governments to take, as a matter of high priority, any action needed to finalize as soon as possible any legislative or administrative arrangements, which are required at the national level, to give effect to the requirements of the adopted amendments to the Convention (and the Code) relating to the certification of ships entitled to fly their flag or port facilities situated in their territory;

3. **RECOMMENDS** that Contracting Governments and Administrations concerned designate dates, in advance of the application date of 1 July 2004, by which requests for:

- .1 review and approval of ship security plans;
- .2 verification and certification of ships; and
- .3 review and approval of port facility security assessments and of port facility security plans

should be submitted in order to allow Contracting Governments, Administrations and recognized security organizations time to complete the review and approval and the verification and certification process and for Companies, ships and port facilities to rectify any non-compliance;

4. **INVITES** Contracting Governments, on and after 1 July 2004, to recognize and accept as valid and as meeting the requirements of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and part A of the Code any:

- .1 Ship security plans approved prior to 1 July 2004, pursuant to the provisions of part A of the Code, by Administrations or on their behalf; and
- .2 International Ship Security Certificates issued, prior to 1 July 2004, in accordance with the provisions of part A of the Code, by Administrations or on their behalf

as far as these relate to ships which, on 1 July 2004, were entitled to fly the flag of the State of the Administration which, or on behalf of which, the plan in question was approved or the certificate in question was issued;

5. **FURTHER RECOMMENDS** that Contracting Governments and the industry take early appropriate action to ensure that all necessary infrastructure is in place in time for the effective implementation of the adopted measures to enhance maritime security on board ships and ashore.

**Conference resolution 7**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Establishment of appropriate measures  
to enhance the security of ships, port facilities,  
mobile offshore drilling units on location and fixed  
and floating platforms not covered by  
chapter XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

RECALLING that chapter XI-2 of the Convention applies only to:

- (a) the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:
  - .1 passenger ships, including passenger high-speed craft; and
  - .2 cargo ships, including cargo high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards; and
  - .3 mobile offshore drilling units; and
- (b) port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages,

RECOGNIZING the important contribution that the implementation of the special measures adopted will make towards the safe and secure operation of ships, for pollution prevention and for the safety and security of those on board and ashore,

RECOGNIZING ALSO the need to address and establish appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships and of port facilities other than those covered by chapter XI-2 of the Convention,

RECOGNIZING FURTHER that the establishment of such measures will further enhance and positively contribute towards the international efforts to ensure maritime security and to prevent and suppress acts threatening the security in the maritime transport sector,

1. INVITES Contracting Governments to the Convention to establish, as they may consider necessary, and to disseminate, as they deem fit,

appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships and of port facilities other than those covered by chapter XI-2 of the Convention;

2. ENCOURAGES, in particular, Contracting Governments to establish, as they may consider necessary, and to disseminate, as they deem fit, information to facilitate the interactions of ships and of port facilities to which chapter XI-2 of the Convention applies with ships which are not covered by chapter XI-2 of the Convention;

3. ALSO ENCOURAGES Contracting Governments to establish, as they may consider necessary, and to disseminate, as they deem fit, information to facilitate contact and liaison between company and ship security officers and the authorities responsible for the security of port facilities not covered by chapter XI-2 of the Convention, prior to a ship entering, or anchoring off, such a port;

4. FURTHER ENCOURAGES Contracting Governments, when exercising their responsibilities for mobile offshore drilling units and for fixed and floating platforms operating on their Continental Shelf or within their Exclusive Economic Zone, to ensure that any security provisions applying to such units and platforms allow interaction with those applying to ships covered by chapter XI-2 of the Convention that serve, or operate in conjunction with, such units or platforms;

5. Requests Contracting Governments to inform the Organization of any action they have taken in this respect.

**Conference resolution 8**  
(adopted on 12 December 2002)

**Enhancement of security in co-operation with the  
International Labour Organization**

(Seafarers' Identity Documents and work on the  
wider issues of port security)

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

RECOGNIZING the important contribution that the implementation of the special measures adopted will make towards the safe and secure operation of ships, for pollution prevention and for the safety and security of those on board and ashore,

RECOGNIZING ALSO the need to continue the work and to establish, as the need arises, further appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships and of port facilities,

RECOGNIZING FURTHER that the development and use of a verifiable Seafarers' Identity Document will further enhance and positively contribute towards the international efforts to ensure maritime security and to prevent and suppress acts threatening the security in the maritime transport sector,

COGNIZANT of the competencies and work of the International Labour Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the ILO") in the area of development and adoption of the international labour standards,

RECALLING the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention, 1958 (No. 108), adopted by the International Labour Conference on 13 May 1958, which entered into force on 19 February 1961,

RECALLING ALSO that the Governing Body of the ILO at its 283rd Session, in March 2002, placed the question of "Improved security for seafarers' identification" as an urgent item on the agenda of the 91st Session of the International Labour Conference, to be held in June 2003, with a view to the adoption of a Protocol to the Seafarers Identity Documents Convention, 1958 (No. 108),

RECALLING FURTHER the long-standing co-operation between the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred as "the Organization") and the ILO in the area of international maritime transport,

NOTING, with satisfaction, the work undertaken, so far, by the Governing Body of the ILO and by the International Labour Office on seafarers' identity documents and on port and dock workers security,

1. INVITES the ILO to continue the development of a Seafarers' Identity Document as a matter of urgency, which should cover, *inter alia*, a document for professional purposes, a verifiable security document and a certification information document;
2. REQUESTS the Organization to consider the results of the 91st Session of the International Labour Conference on the "Improved security for seafarers' identification" and to take appropriate action, as it deems appropriate;
3. INVITES States through their tripartite delegations to participate in the 91st Session of the International Labour Conference, in June 2003, and to give favourable consideration to the earliest possible ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the new ILO instrument concerning seafarers' identification documents, once it is adopted;
4. INVITES the Organization and the ILO to establish a joint ILO/IMO Working Group to undertake any further work which may be required on the wider issue of port security, based on the terms of reference set out in the attached annex;
5. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization to contribute, with appropriate expertise, to the work of the ILO on the "Improved security for seafarers' identification" and to the proposed joint work on the wider issue of port security;
6. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization to transmit a copy of this resolution to the Director-General of the International Labour Office.

## Annex

### IMO/ILO work on port security

#### POSSIBLE TERMS OF REFERENCE

- 1 The joint IMO/ILO Working Group on Port Security, having regard to the amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code adopted by the December 2002 Conference of Contracting Governments

to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 for the purpose of introducing mandatory requirements and guidance relating to the enhancement of the safety and security of ships and of port facilities, should:

- .1 consider and recommend, for the purpose of enhancing security, safety and the protection of the environment, the form and content of any further guidance which may be required on the wider issue of port security, including the relationship between ship and port security, and the wider security and safety and the protection of the environment considerations relevant to port areas, including the question of verifiable identification of those working within these areas or having access to such areas;
- .2 consider the need for any mandatory requirements relating to the above and, if such a need is identified, to recommend the form and content of such requirements; and
- .3 prepare and submit a report (including interim work and progress reports) on the aforesaid, together with the relevant reasons and justifications thereto, as well as an assessment of the impact, benefits and costs of the recommendations, for the consideration of the International Maritime Organization and of the International Labour Organization.

2 The International Maritime Organization and the International Labour Organization will monitor the work of the joint IMO/ILO Working Group on Port Security and, as the need arises, will issue appropriate instructions and guidance to the Working Group.





**Conference resolution 9**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Enhancement of security in co-operation with the  
World Customs Organization**

**(Closed cargo transport units)**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

RECOGNIZING the important contribution that the implementation of the special measures adopted will make towards the safe and secure operation of ships, for pollution prevention and for the safety and security of those on board and ashore,

RECOGNIZING ALSO the need to address and establish appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships and of port facilities in aspects other than those covered by chapter XI-2 of the Convention,

RECALLING that the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 already contains requirements related to the provision to Administrations of commercial data related to the movement of cargoes by sea,

RECOGNIZING FURTHER the need to include, in due course, in the Convention appropriate requirements to address specifically the security of closed cargo transport units (hereinafter referred to as "closed CTUs") and that such requirements will further enhance and positively contribute towards the international efforts to ensure maritime security and to prevent and suppress acts threatening security in the maritime transport sector,

FURTHERMORE RECOGNIZING the inter-modal and international nature of closed CTUs movements, the need to ensure security of the complete supply chain and the respective roles of all those involved,

RECALLING ALSO the role of frontier agencies, in particular Customs Administrations, in controlling the international movement of closed CTUs,

COGNIZANT of the competencies and work of the World Customs Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the WCO") in the area of international maritime transport,

RECALLING FURTHER the long-standing co-operation of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Organization") with the WCO in the area of international maritime transport,

NOTING with satisfaction the signing on 23 July 2002 of a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen the co-operation between the two Organizations,

1. INVITES the WCO to consider, urgently, measures to enhance security throughout international movements of closed CTUs;
2. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization to contribute expertise relating to maritime transport and, in particular, to the carriage of closed CTUs by sea to the discussions at the WCO;
3. AGREES that the Convention should be amended, if and when appropriate, to give effect to relevant decisions taken by the WCO and endorsed by the Contracting Governments to the Convention insofar as they relate to the carriage of closed CTUs by sea;
4. REQUESTS the Secretary-General of the Organization to transmit a copy of this resolution to the Secretary-General of the WCO.



**Conference resolution 10**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Early implementation of long-range  
ship's identification and tracking**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention"), concerning special measures to enhance safety and security,

RECALLING that long-range identification and tracking of ships at sea is a measure that fully contributes to the enhancement of the maritime and coastal States' security as a whole,

HAVING ACKNOWLEDGED that Inmarsat C polling is currently an appropriate system for long-range identification and tracking of ships,

RECOGNIZING the importance of an early implementation of long-range identification and tracking of ships,

RECOGNIZING ALSO that the equipment installed on board and ashore is available for immediate use and will allow the early implementation of such measures,

1. URGES Contracting Governments to take, as a matter of high priority, any action needed at national level to give effect to implementing and beginning the long-range identification and tracking of ships;
2. INVITES Contracting Governments to encourage ships entitled to fly the flag of their State to take the necessary measures so that they are prepared to respond automatically to Inmarsat C polling, or to other available systems;
3. REQUESTS Contracting Governments to consider all aspects related to the introduction of long-range identification and tracking of ships, including its potential for misuse as an aid to ship targeting and the need for confidentiality in respect of the information so gathered.

**Conference resolution 11**  
*(adopted on 12 December 2002)*

**Human-element-related aspects and  
shore leave for seafarers**

THE CONFERENCE,

HAVING ADOPTED amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), concerning special measures to enhance maritime safety and security,

RECOGNIZING that the shipping industry and the smooth transportation of goods are essential to world trade,

RECALLING that the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Organization”) adopted resolution A.907(22) on the long-term work programme of the Organization (up to 2008) and that the human element is an important item thereof,

RECALLING ALSO the provisions of the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965, as amended, which has, *inter alia*, established a general right for foreign crew members to be entitled to shore leave while the ship on which they arrived is in port, provided that the formalities on arrival of the ship have been fulfilled and the public authorities have no reason to refuse permission to come ashore for reasons of public health, public safety or public order,

RECALLING FURTHER the generally accepted principles of international human rights applicable to all workers, including seafarers,

CONSIDERING that, given the global nature of the shipping industry, seafarers need special protection,

BEING AWARE that seafarers work and live on ships involved in international trade and that access to shore facilities and shore leave are vital elements of seafarers’ general well-being and, therefore, to the realization of safer seas and cleaner oceans,

BEING AWARE ALSO that the ability to go ashore is essential for joining and leaving a ship after the agreed period of service,

1. URGES Contracting Governments to take the human element, the need to afford special protection to seafarers and the critical importance of shore leave into account when implementing the provisions of chapter XI-2

of the Convention and the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code (hereinafter referred to as "the Code");

2. ENCOURAGES Contracting Governments, Member States of the Organization and non-governmental organizations with consultative status at the Organization to report to the Organization any instances where the human element has been adversely impacted by the implementation of the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention or the Code; and
3. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Facilitation Committee of the Organization, any human-element-related problems which have been communicated to the Organization as a result of the implementation of chapter XI-2 of the Convention or the Code.